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ABSTRACT
The aim of this Master Thesis is to construct a framework to analyze interactions 
between politics, society, and the bureaucracy with each other. This framework is then 
adapted to the Turkish case to model policy making mechanisms in economic issues. When 
the bureaucracy emerges as a separate actor in the political field, the relationship between 
political actors and the society significantly changes. It may mitigate the problems observed 
in this relationship by providing an information and commitment mechanism or it may lead to 
a new set of problems. Unless politicians are able to 'discipline' the civil service, they cannot 
govern the state. The furkish case is an example of how participation of the bureaucracy to 
the relationship between politics and society affects economic variables.
Keywords: Bureaucracy, Political Economy, Turkey
ÖZET
Bu tezin amaci siyaset, toplum ve bürokrasi arasindaki etkileşimi anlamak amaciyla 
bir çal İsına çerçevesi oluşturmak ve bu çerçeveyi Türkiye örneğine adapte ederek iktisadi 
konular ile ilgili karar verme mekanizmalarinin faaliyetlerinin modellenmesine imkan 
saglamaktir. Bürokrasinin politika sahasinda ayri bir varlik olarak ortaya cikmasi siyasetçi- 
seçmen ilişkisini önemli ölçüde değiştirecektir. Bu ilişkide ortaya çikan problemler 
bürokrasinin sagladigi bilgi ve taahhüt mekanizmalari ile azaltılabilir veya yeni problemler 
ortaya çikabilir. Bürokrasinin politikacilar tarafından disiplin altina alinmamasi durumunda 
siyasi idareler devleti idare etme güçlerini kaybederler. Türkiye örneği bürokrasinin siyaset- 
toplum ilişkisine aktif olarak katilmasi halinde iktisadi değişkenlerin nasil etkileneceğini 
gösteren bir örnektir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bürokrasi, Politik Ekonomi, Türkiye.
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this Master Thesis is to construct a framework which covers the 
interactions between politics, society, and the bureaucracy with each other and to adapt this 
framework to the Turkish case to construct a set up to model the operation of decision making 
mechanisms on economic issues.
In public economics what we observe in most cases is inefficient allocation of public 
resources, ineffective policies, and suboptimal decisions. The interaction between the politics 
and the electorates is the main source of such inferior actions. In such a system there are 
three problem fields; 7'he first one is between the party and its supporters (party vs. soeiety). 
The problem is that once the voters elect a certain party, their control on their representatives 
is significantly reduced due to monitoring cost.
The second problem is between the present government and the future government 
(between parties). Although the cooperation of the parties on certain issues may increase the 
benefit of all, they act independent from each other to increase their utility (usually to increase 
the probability of reelection) and hurt each other.
The third problem is between the different groups in the society with opposing 
interests, which compete to gain the public authority. The resources are scarce, so falling 
behind means that the larger share of the cake will be gained by the opponent. It is a prisoner's 
dilemma in which prisoners are trying to maximize their share in the expense of general 
interest.
In this study the state will not be taken as an instrument of the elected governments for 
their own specific political purposes. Moreover the concept of the state will be separated from 
the politics and be regarded as a separate entity. In other words the conceptualization of the 
state is political rather than legal, so that the degree of autonomy of the state elite from their 
political masters is crucial.
There will be three basic entities in this study: the state elites, the political elites, and 
the society, with corresponding subgroups within each entity. First I will explore the 
relationship between society and politics. Then the bureaucracy will be inserted into the 
system as a separate actor which has its own preferences. After having constructed a general 
framework to understand the interactions between politics, society and the bureaucracy, 
Turkish case will be adapted to this framework to understand to what extent a one-to-one 
correspondence is possible and to what extent the Turkish political structure represents 
relations peculiar to its own. Beginning from the Ottoman Empire, this structure will be 
investigated in a chronological manner. Surveys of various authors will be used to understand 
the attitude and the motivation of the bureaucrats. Finally I propose an empirical analysis of 
macro variables to understand whether the empirical findings will support the basic assertions 
or not.
CHAPTER ONE
STA TE AND SOCIETY IN CLASSICAL 
DEMOCRA TIC MODELS
In this chapter I will, first, examine the relationship between society and political 
arena in classical democratic models. These models are 'democratic' in the sense that authority 
is assumed to be in the hands of those elected by polity. Politieal actors represent the interests 
of electorates, at least partially. Their traditional feature comes from their neglecting of the 
presence of the bureaucracy (or the state) as a separate agent. Since in these models state is 
seen as an apparatus of political actors, there will be no differentiation between state and 
politics in this part. Then 1 will dcline cooperation, coordination and commitment problems 
and then examine possible solution alternatives together with their deficiencies. At the end of 
this first chapter I will discuss decision mechanisms studied in certain papers whose models 
are constructed in a similar framework.
/. INTRODUCTION
In modern democracies people are governed by themselves through their elected 
representatives. The political process is necessary to link preferences and demands of 
individuals to governments. Decisions are made according to a voting rule — usually majority 
voting. Political institutions are regarded as a means of solutions to the colleetive action 
problems, which appear because of the conflicting interests among various groups within 
polity.
Positive Theory of Institutions, which I summarize above has owed so much to Social 
Choice theory and the Economics of Organization. The model borrows majority rule and the 
presence of heterogeneous interests from the first theory, and the disciplinary role of 
institutions from the seeond. The former would lead to instability without the latter. When 
voters have multidimensional interests, shifting coalitions and cycling over the entire outcome 
space follow the majority voting. As a result, it fails to generate equilibrium social choice'. 
Aceording to Economics of Organization institutions act as a means of enhancing gains from 
exchange. The presence of institutions put effective constraints to the operation of majority 
rule by regulating the agenda and decision-makers.
The institution which s analyzed is legislation body — and committees. Most of the 
studies have focused on the politics of the United States and Congress. It is assumed that 
legislators are able to eontrol the outcome of bureaueratic structure. Hence public bureaucracy 
exists to exercise the wills of their political masters, 'fhis does not mean that the role of the 
bureaucracy is completely undermined. Politicians also want to prevent 'bureaucratic drift'.
1 Arrow (1951)
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1. e. deviation of agency from the orders of the incumbent. However one should note that these 
drifts do not occur as a result of an ideological preferences of the bureaucracy, but rather due 
to shirking behavior examined in the classic Principal-Agent framework. Lack of a class 
structure in the bureaucracy of United States causes a narrower scope in these studies.
2. DEFINITION OF PROBLEMS
Interaction of politics and society leads to certain problems in the economy which 
causes inefficient use of private and public resources. There are three fundamental problem 
fields in the model portrayed in Figure 1-1: i.) Within the Polity, ii.) Within the Politics, and 
iii.) Between the Polity and the Politics. We can divide the problems seen in these fields into 
two: First, there exist cooperation, coordination, and commitment problems which occurred 
among the groups competing to impose their interests on other groups. Second, insufficient 
motivation of the authorized people who are supposed to pursue the interests of those who 
delegate the authority.
Figure 1-1: The Relationship Between the State and the Polity
The first problem field is the polity. There are cooperation, coordination, and 
commitment problems among the various groups within the polity who compete lor the 
provision of public service. This is the famous Prisoners' Dilemma of the Game Theory. 
Players in the game with conflicting interests fail to cooperate, compromise and restrict their 
action space. They demand from the state whatever they can capture to maximize their utility, 
ignoring the actions of the others who are motivated in a similar manner. Every group 
demands the maximum he can get which reduces the benefit ol the whole society. It is a 
conflict between the collectivist side of the people and the individualistic behavior. A person
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as a member of the society desires the promotion of the social welfare, but he also seeks the 
best for himself
Same sort of dilemma is also present among the politicians competing for re-election. 
The process is similar to an auction where each politician reveals his bid and electorates give 
their votes to the one with the highest bid. Naturally state resources are not limitless and a 
large scale of public provision would cause serious economic problems, like inflation, 
deficits, high debts, inefficiency, etc. The winner, which gives the highest bid, should also 
face these problems, which in turn decreases the probability of its re-election. If the 
politicians are able to compromise and restrain themselves and make binding commitments, 
their ruling will be less constrained and more easygoing. However political competition and 
lack of mechanisms to enforce agreements prevent such a cooperation. Each side worries 
about a legislative drift in the future, i.e. nullification of their policies by future governments. 
Due to lack of a higher authority to enforce agreements, there occurs a commitment problem 
which makes players suspicious about the promises of the opponent.
Another cooperation, coordination and commitment problem is observed within the 
politics among various decision makers who are supposed to be on the same side. Beside the 
conflicting interests among different candidates of government, it is also possible to face 
conflicting interests within government. Such a conflict may occur even though they are the 
members of the same party. For example ministers of the cabinet may fail to yield a 
coordination with each other and pursue different goals which contradict with the policies of 
their colleagues^.
The third problem field is between the electorates and the politicians. Wills of 
individuals will be transformed into government action through election system. Parties have 
to support and represent demands of electorates to secure their votes and to be elected. Parties 
are assumed to represent the interests of their constituencies. This is not an ethic choice, but a 
rational decision of the political actors. Even though they do not care about public policy and 
try to maximize the probability of their election, it is expected to observe complete 
convergence of policies toward the median voter. However once the electorates give their 
votes, their control over their representatives is significantly reduced. Also the complexity of 
the public policies may prevent electorates to be informed about the actions of their 
representatives. Unless the political system provides necessary incentives to incumbents to 
fulfill their commitments, parties may use the power of government for their own individual 
or ideological benefit. This is the moral hazard problem of the Game Theory which explains
2 Preparation of budget draft by the execution body is the best example of conflict of interests among decision 
makers within the governing offices. On one side there exist spending ministers who care about their funds, not 
resources and biased to spending to serve their specific interests. Since the expenditures of those ministers are 
directed to specific interest groups and their financing falls into the whole society, they completely internalize the 
benefit of their spending, while leaving some portion of tax burden to the others. So both the benefit of individual 
gains and the negative externality of spending on other groups cause expenditures higher than socially optimal 
level. On the other side there exist Prime Minister and Finance Minister who do not have a particular interest of 
spending and care about the general welfare (Von Hagen (1992)).
^ "Well then, says I, what's the use you learning to do right when it is troublesome to do right and ain't so trouble 
to do wrong, and the wages is just the same?' (Mark Twain - The Adventures of Huckelberry Finn).
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the change in motivation and action of the agent after being authorized by the principal. 
Another extension of the Principal-Agent problem is the adverse selection in which the 
electorates fail to provide necessary incentives to attract 'good' politicians into the political 
system, thanks to the asymmetric information about the quality of politicians.
One should also note that when party structure is embodied into the system, another 
filter appears which makes the relationship between the polity and the public authority even 
more indirect. The reason is that in modern political systems party lords are not only the 
agents of electorates, but also representatives of their supporters who elect them as party 
candidates. Relation of political actors with their supporters within the party structure is 
similar to their relation with electorates. They face a similar competition within the party, 
which is facilitated by a similar demand coming from groups that have formal or quasi-formal 
ties with the party. The more they back these demands, the more people will support their 
candidacy. Hence we face another Prisoners' Dilemma within parties. On the other hand once 
party lords gain the party authority, they attempt -  and to a certain extent succeed — to 
construct a party structure that is more convenient to continue their leadership. Their 
commitment to the promises given to their supporters loses its strength. Naturally intra-party 
cooperation problem is less radical than the inter-party problem, because the opposing 
interests are rather nearer to each other.
3. REASONS OF PROBLEMS
Before proceeding to the reason of those problems that are summarized above, it is 
necessary to pay a closer attention to the basic distinction between the problems observed in 
private sector and public sector. This distinction is the existence of public authority of which 
players are competing to control: whoever gets to exercise it has the right to tell everyone else 
what to do, whether they want to do it or nob*.
The key feature of public authority is that the possessors of public authority have the 
right to impose their wills on the rest of the people without any limitations other than legal 
restrictions. This peculiarity presents a major distinction with compare to private sector where 
all transactions are voluntarily and all agents have the right to turn down the offer that makes 
them worse off:
" When two poor people and one rich person make up a polity governed by 
majority rule, the rich person is in trouble....because they whll use public 
authority to take aw^ ay some o f his money. Public authority gives them the 
right to make themselves better off at his expense^"
Public authority is, in fact, a special type of externality observed in political economy. 
Note that the problem of externality arises when there is lack of institutions to ensure that
4|Vloe (1991). 
5|\/loe(1990a), p.221.
State and Society in Classical Democratic Models - 6
individuals pay for the costs of their actions and paid for the benefits resulting from their 
actions. Thus the social cost of an action might deviate considerably from the private cost.
3.1 Problems Within the Polity
The following features of the political system lead to cooperation problem within the
polity:
• Conflicting Interests
• Lack of Information Mechanisms
• Means for Redistributive Politics
• Lack of Commitment Mechanisms in Politics
3.1.1 Conflicting Interests
Inability of individuals to act in a collective manner is a common problem emerged 
due to heterogeneity of individuals. The inevitable conflict between the self-interested side of 
an individual with his other-regarding social side is brilliantly demonstrated by Samuelson's 
Provision Condition of Public Good<> On the other hand agents may fail to cooperate if there 
is a conflict over distribution of a 'private good'. In that case there exist ex-post winners and 
losers^. It is not possible to create a perfect harmony among the individuals, since 
heterogeneity is an exogenous variable. But, factors which determines the magnitude of 
conflict is endogenous. The dominant conflict-creating factor is unequal income and wealth 
distribution. A low level of distributional conflict will reduce demand for distributional 
policies and alleviate the scope of cooperation problem within the society' .^
Fragmentation and polarization of the polity increase the degree of cooperation 
problem. Fragmentation means the separation of society into many subgroups who are willing 
to promote their own interests. Whereas polarization implies the level of disagreement among 
various groups within the society. The first factor determines the number of actors in the 
game. The more agents compete with each other, the later they reach an equilibrium solution. 
On the other hand the second factor determines the magnitude of payoffs. As the difference 
between success and loss increases, people will have more desire to win the game which 
augments the degree of the competition in return.
® This condition states that the cost of production of unit public good is financed optimally by the individuals in 
such a way that each person pays a certain portion of the cost which is equivalent to the marginal benefit 
obtained from its provision. Since it is very unlike or costly to observe the benefits of individuals, we face a free­
rider problem where individuals try to escape from the payment of its while enjoying its benefit.
 ^ See 'War of Attrition Models' for conflict over distrbuton of a public good (Alesina and Drazen [1991], and 
Drazen [1994]).
** See Spolaore (1993)for a model examining win-or-lose contest over ex-ante pay-off among coalition parties, 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) for a static modeling of conlict over ex-post pay-off, and Laban and 
Struzenegger (1993) for a dynamic modeling of ex-post pay-off. Also see Roubini and Sachs (1989a and 
1989b), A lt and Lowry (1994), and Poterba (1994)for empirical support.
9 Alesina and Rodrik (1994) explain how distributive conflicts among agents endowed with different capital-to- 
labor shares cause different fiscal policy objectives.
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3.1.2 Lack of Information Mechanisms
Information problems can be divided into two categories: Asymmetric Information 
and Lack of Information. In both cases political actors face a difficulty in gathering 
information about the opponents and/or the environment. For example individuals may 
demand distributional politics in favor of their interests without considering the burden of its 
finance in the long term. Another example is that some groups may resist a 'good' policy 
which will make them better off. So, using insufficient amount of information they may fail to 
act in the optimal way. Cost of monitoring the behavior of the opponents is a third example 
which causes the continuance of competition within the society. Finally if the legal structure 
fails to punish the disobedient, then to have information about their actions will further trigger 
the level of competition.
3.1.3 Means for Redistribution Politics
Another source of cooperation problem within the polity is the discretionary control of 
means for redistribution politics by government authorities'*’. The more these instruments are, 
the greater demand for their control arises. Some examples of these instruments are direct 
transfer payments, subsidies to certain goods and services, economic investments of the 
government, infrastructure investments, rent-creating regulations, restrictions and 
prohibitions, etc. Hence various groups and classes in the society will struggle to capture 
public authority to control this rent-creating power to use it for distributive purposes to the 
best of their interest.
3.1.4 Lack of Commitment Mechanisms in Politics
The electorates may not be sure whether governments in the future will be able to 
resist self-interested demands of people with opposing interests. Once government changes, 
new government may pursue the interests of its supporters, often at the expense of losers. 
Therefore uncertainty, instability and lack of commitments in the political system increase the 
level of competition and search for self-interested policies.
"There is no external enforcement mechanism (no higher level o f authority) to
police agreements once they struck, majorities and governments at time t
cannot bind those at time /+7, and the incentives to renege are often
substantial." ''
If electorates are not certain about the identity and the tenure of the incumbent, their 
confidence on the commitments of government further deteriorates. Hence political 
uncertainty increases the scope of the problem.
lO Atiyas (1995b). 
Moe (1990a) p220.
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3.2 Problems Within the Political System
The following features of the political system lead to cooperation and commitment 
problem within the political system:
• Nature of Public Authority and Politics
• Heterogeneous Party Structures
• Information Problems
3.2.1 Nature of Public Authority and Politics
Some of the reasons of these problems are similar to those observed within the polity. 
Parties compete to gain public authority to capture particular rent opportunities. Hence the 
cooperation problem among parties is unavoidable, if the only way of seizing the authority is 
through free elections and if electorates demand their representatives to support their 
interests'2. To be in the office may not be an objective of the party (or more probably not the 
only objective), but it is so crucial that without its presence it would have very little value to 
have any objective at all. Therefore parties find it necessary to supply the demand of the 
electorates to be elected. This type of supply-demand relation is inherent in the nature of 
public authority.
Politicians should not only consider the pressure coming from the society, but also 
conflicting interests of other parties. Once a new government is formed, it will be anxious 
about legislative drift in the future. Since public authority legitimizes the actions of 
government, it is also possible for future governments to pursue policies different than the 
present one and there is nothing to do against the nullification of past policies*3. So, the 
incumbent may prefer to restrict the action space of the next government.
3.2.2 Heterogeneous Party Structures
Demand for self-interested policies need not to come from the electorates who have no 
formal connection with the political parties. Although lack of coordination among the 
politicians induces predatory behaviors and redistributive politics, this does not mean that 
there is no cooperation in the political arena at all. Political actors should also consider the 
pressure coming from their subordinates. They find it necessary to uphold relatively narrow 
interests of support groups'^. The more heterogeneous and polarized groups are, the more
Aghian and Bolton (1990) concentrate on the use of public debt to affect the probability of reelection. Some 
authors examine the use of fiscal variables in order to persuade the voter about the incompetence of the 
opponent; See Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994) for a model explainng the use of efficiency of tax system as 
a state variable in order to affect the popularity of opponents. Refer to Roubin and Sachs (1989a and 1989b), 
and Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), to observe the effect of elections on fiscal variables in industrial 
countries and to Spolaore (1993) for a smilar study on United States.
^^Shepsle (1992).
See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for the conflict of a politician who has difficulty in acting both as a party 
member and a a representative of the constituency. To be a candidate, politicians should address median voter 
of their parties. Once they reveal their preferences it will be difficult to convince voters that they will pursue 
policies closer to the preferences of median voter of another society or district. His examination of presidents of 
Unted States shows that most voter ideal points are more moderate than the positions of candidates. They
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extreme demands will be requested. Hence polarized intra-party groups will expand the inter­
party competition ‘ ^ .
3.2.3 Presence of Rent-Creating Instruments
Another source of uncooperative behavior among parties is abundance of rent-creating 
instruments in the hands of incumbent. Rent-creating instruments are the primary payoffs of 
the Prisoners' Dilemma. They will increase the degree of competition among the political 
parties because of the increasing benefit of predatory behavior'
3.2.4 Information Problems
Although the reason and impact of information problem on political arena is very 
similar to those of society, we have some extensions. First of all political actors may fail to 
have information not only about each other but also about electorates they are supposed to 
represent. The competition within the politics may trigger a higher degree of cooperation 
problem, although their voters are more moderate then they are'^. Another case may be that 
they may hesitate to implement 'hard' policies in crises which hurt the society, without 
knowing that behaving 'softly' will further deteriorate their reputation. Of course such a 
failure may also be occurred if they do not know their own quality'".
3.3 Prohlems Between the Polity and the Political Actors
There is a Principal-Agent type of problem between electorates and political parties, 
where parties act as the agent and the electorates as the principal Political actors are supposed 
to represent the interests of their constituencies; at least it is the reason they are elected. This 
is not an ethic choice, but a rational decision of the political actors in order to be elected. 
Even though they do not care about public policy and only try to maximize the probability of 
their election, it is expected to observe a complete convergence of policies toward the median 
v o t e r 'T he n  why do we observe different policies from government to government? 'What is 
the reason of existence more than one party if all should have same preferences with the 
median voter for re-election?
cannot converge to the preferences of median voter, due to credibility problem. On the other hand S tr0m  (1994) 
gives an example from Norway for credibility loss of parties who deviate from their party preferences.
 ^^  S tr0m  (1994) gives a perfect example of how intra-party competition affects the inter-party competition and 
bargaining significantly. One should also note the following dilemma revealed by S tr0m  which is not explored 
so intensively: Even parties make promises from their principles before the elections, they will face a credibility 
problem since voters will not believe their word: Parties have a very little ideological mobility.
IS  Atiyas (1995a and 1995b).
In the extreme case politics may turn into a means of elite conflict (Heper[1987a]) in which competitors 
declare themselves as the voice of interest of their constitutes who have objectives far away from those of their 
representatives.
See Milesi-Ferretti (1992)for a model where competence level of parties are unknown .
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995).
State and Society in Classical Democratic Models - 10
There are four reasons which lead to Principal-Agent problem between representatives 
and their supporters:
• Multidimensional preferences
• Imperfect monitoring of representatives by voters
• Asymmetric information
• Involuntary participation of voters to the system
3.3.1 Multi-dimensional Preferences
If preferences are uni-dimensional and single-peak, then majority rule produces an 
equilibrium outcome .Thus it would be possible for electorates to elect a candidate according 
to the preferences of the median voter. However in a polity world with more than one 
dimension of choice, majority rule yields no stable outcome^o. It is likely that there will be 
more than one individual who represent the median voter in each dimension. In other words 
there will be no unique median voter at all. Thus candidates can win elections without 
representing the preferences of electorates.
3.3.2 Imperfect monitoring of Representatives by Voters
Electorates should equip political parties with two types of incentive. First one is 
necessary for the participation of individuals to political parties. After the participation of 
agents, the second one is needed to motivate them to act in the right way.
Incentives for participation are of'carrot' type, due to the nature of politics. No one can 
be forced to be a politician; it is completely a voluntarily choice. Hence only positive 
incentives can be offered to the politicians, such as deference, respect, esteem, status, and 
powei-f The problem we observe in the participation phase is the adverse selection, i.e., the 
entrance of low-quality people into politics is due to lack of necessary incentives for high- 
quality politicians. If to be a politician does not yield so much respect and esteem, but on the 
contrary antipathy and repugnance, then the attitude of the society to politicians will provide 
an additional constraint, not an incentive to the political arena. What we observe in politics is 
the well-known lemon-market case in Game-Theory^^.
Next incentive is regarding to the motivation of politicians. If electorates desire the 
promotion of their interests, they should trust on some mechanisms other than the loyalty and 
good-will of politicians^^. However once elections are completed incentives that compel 
politicians to fulfill these interests lose their seriousness. Election is the mechanism that 
provides the link between voters and their representatives -- there is no other way that can
Arrow (1951).
Note that all are intangible, since it is not ethical to offer tangible assets to make someone a politician.
22 Akerlof[1970]).
23 It is showed that the solution to the Principal-Agent problem is Pareto efficient if and only if the motivation 
constraint is not binding (Ross [1973]). Here by motivation constraint Ross refers to the First Order Condition of 
the optimization problem of the agent, which enters the optimization problem of the principal as a constraint. This 
means that we can get an efficient solution if and if only if the agent does not behave optimally.
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match it for the same purpose: neither public protests, campaigns nor meetings and protest 
letters^ .^ The root of the problem is that the only costless way of monitoring agents' action is 
the eleetion. All other mechanisms, whose examples are stated above are either imperfect — 
not effective in imposing wills of electorates — or very costly. Besides, a perfect monitoring 
of agents is not sufficient. There should also exist punishment mechanisms to enforce 
eommitment.
Party structure provokes one additional difficulty in monitoring of political actors. 
Modern politics is the politics oi parties. Reputation of a political party incorporates the 
reputation of its members. Remember that although parties have an infinite length of life as an 
organization, life of politicians is finite. Hence parties are more sensitive to keep their 
reputation, unlike party members who may use public authority to promote their selfish 
interests at the expense of their parties' reputation. Because the tenure of a representative may 
be long enough to fulfill selfish their interests, the fear of elections does not create a restraint 
to their behaviors.
Myopic behavior of the electorates and memoryless attitudes enhance the degree of the 
commitment problem by reducing the cost of defection incurred to the agent. When winners 
violate pre-election agreements, they should consider the possibility of punishment in 
subsequent elections. However if voters are myopic or memoryless, then the cost of defection 
decreases with time. Myopic attitude acts as a discount factor for the degree of punishment. 
Since it is possible to escape from being penalized by voters, temporary negative attitude of 
public opinion will not be sufficient to discourage parties from renouncing their 
commitments.
3.3.3 Asymmetric Information
It is very difficult for electorates to gather and perceive information about government 
actions and the environment. Even access to particular information may not be possible, due 
to some prohibitive measures and security constraints. Information costs represent a great 
autonomy for politicians to pursue policies free of voters' scrutiny.
Electorates should overcome two difficulties to reach information. One is information 
gathering phase. Today the authority of the government have expanded to such an extent that 
there is very few areas in daily life of an ordinary citizen which is out of its influence. The 
result is a massive flow of information. Leaving the problem of having access to information 
aside, even the accumulation of all related information is a problem for electorates. Then we 
face the first filter: Each individual pay closer attention to issues which are directly related to 
their interests. The immediate result is that as the number of people who have concern about 
particular government actions decreases, monitoring of the society loses its influence.
24 Even we observe the resignation of a deputy before elections, it is still true that if he chooses not to resign, 
there is almost no mechanism that could impose him to do so. For example if a party has a strong majority in the 
parliament and this majority supports its leader unconditionally, there is no way to dismiss him ~  including the 
legal enforcement mechanisms.
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Even the amount of information in hand is manageable for electorates, it does not 
mean that it is perceivable. The first problem is that the information may be too complex to be 
understood by people. A rather more difficult problem is to face different pieces of 
information which are conflicting with each other. Then the electorate uses another filter: He 
classifies the reliability of information according to its source where the prejudice becomes 
the only criterion. This is another leak in perfect monitoring of the agent.
The result is an imperfect monitoring of government actions. Therefore government 
finds it possible to pursue its own interests without being detected by electorates.
Another information problem may be observed between the political parties and the 
polity due to lack of information mechanisms. When parties have no perfect information 
about voters' preferences, then we face an undeliberate principal-agent problem: Without 
realizing wills of the principal, the agent acts contrary to his interests^^. Presence of elections 
forces convergence of policies to the preferences of median voter only to a certain extent. 
The reason is that parties do not know these preferences exactly.
3.3.4 Involuntary Participation of Voters to the System
Fear-of-state creates an additional constraint to the effectiveness of monitoring. As we 
discussed before, transactions in public sector are involuntary. Incumbent party has the power 
to pursue policies that affect the welfare of electorates and electorates can do very little to 
escape from that effect. They cannot sack the agent — usually they should wait until the next 
election — or leave the systeni^ .^ when they face an action 'harmful' to their interests. Once 
elections are completed, the principal becomes subordinate to the agent. This dependence may 
discourage electorates from an effective monitoring of government actions. A similar 
situation is observed when we examine the relation between party supporters and party lords. 
Although party lords have an authority lower in magnitude, this power may be enough to 
abandon the utilization of an effective monitoring by party supporters.
4. REMEDIES
There are two enemies to fear for a citizeiF^: Other citizens with opposing interests 
who are competing to gain public authority and public officials who hold authority to impose 
their selfish interests. Thus individuals do not only compete with other people to seize the 
public authority, but also struggle with the incumbent to employ the state apparatus for their 
service. Remedies to the first and second problem will be discussed respectively.
-^‘’Alesina and Rosenthal (1995).
Naturally for an ordinary citizen it may not be a feasible solution to leave the system, i.e. to immigrate to 
another country.
27 Мое (1990a) p.233.
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4.1 Prisoners* Dilemma Within the Polity and Within the. Political 
System
The peculiar feature of transactions in the public sector is the use of public authority 
almost without any constraint. Usually any defection from the pre-election deals is very 
attractive due its short term benefits. Hence the commitment of the winners to the agreements 
is not expected by the losers. The problem is appreciating 'the property rights' of people. 
Since there cannot be a higher level of authority to enforce the agreements in a democratic 
country, it is not possible to find a complete solution to this problem. "It is inherent in public 
author ity"'^ .^
However it is possible to create certain mechanisms to attenuate the problems incurred 
during the execution of public authority. Some of these mechanisms should be created 
exogenously, whereas some may be appeared within the system. These mechanisms are as 
follows:
• Legal Restrictions: I'he constitution, laws, regulations, party regulations, 
election system, and courts
• Other Formal Institutions: Committees and political parties
• Co-optation
• Repeated Game Strategies
• Coase Theorem
All mechanisms other than the last two may be adapted to the system exogenously.
4.1.1 Legal Restrictions
In most cases legal restrictions have a negative nature: they imply what cannot be 
done, instead of what can be. They restrict the policies of the incumbent in such a way that 
winners of elections become unable to enjoy from the benefits of the public authority in its 
extreme. Legal restrictions put a limit on the use of rent-creating instruments, define the 
'property rights' of losers, prevent extreme policies, and discourage fragmentation^^^ Also 
structuring 'the property rights', they enable the emergence of self-enforcing cooperative 
arrangements, which will be discussed later.
There are three deficiencies of legal mechanisms. First of all the way they are prepared 
and modified. Second the independence of courts. Third their execution.
Legal restrictions are prepared and modified by representatives of the voters — party 
chambers or parliaments. In presidential systems the decision of the congress is subject the 
approval of the president. Hence the congress cannot use the legislation authority in an
28 Мое (1990a) p.233.
29 It depends on the election system. It may award the central parties as it is in Britain, or it may lead to further 
fragmentation which is the case in Israel and Italy.
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unconstrained way^o. Whereas in parliamentary systems, any party that gains the majority in 
the parliament ean use the legislation authority almost without any eonstraint^'. Therefore 
legal restrictions in parliamentary systems are not binding; onee the majority changes the 
agreement provided by the previous laws can be reshuffled. Agents of parliamentary systems, 
either within the polity or within the political system, cannot rely on the enforcement of legal 
restrictions. In party chambers the incumbent is even more dominant. Once he is elected, he 
can more easily change the party structure and election system to sustain his position.
Existence of courts seems to smooth this problem. They, first, check the consistency 
of legislation: Laws should not conflict with the constitution, regulations with laws, and so 
on. Second they scrutinize the coherence of government acts to legal restrictions. Naturally 
the reliability of these restrictions as a commitment mechanism depends on to what extent 
courts are independent from the government.
However rhetoric legal restrictions are and whatever the degree of their 
comprehension in theory, their strength as a commitment mechanism depends on their 
applicability in practice. It may be the case that government prefer not to obey these 
restrictions. Such a situation may be observed if the mechanisms to enforce these laws are not 
powerful enough, if it is possible to deceive formal rules^ ,^ or if the cost of defiance is not 
sufficiently high to deter such an action.
Even when legal restrictions are executed perfectly, this may lead another problem. 
One should also keep in mind that restricting the actions politicians perfectly does not always 
provide a better result for society. Such limitations decrease policy alternatives of the 
incumbent. The procedural ehoices runs into the usual trade-off between commitments and 
flexibility: by making it very difficult to change the law, one makes commitments more 
credible but reduces the probability of reaeting to unforeseen shocks-^ .^
However one should note that the acts of the congress are not controlled by a higher authority, because it is 
the only body that has the right to legislate laws. The role of president is to check and balance the authority of 
the congress which also restraints the execution authority of the president.
I prefer to use the phrase 'almost' to lessen the statement of the sentence. Although a simple majority is 
needed to change and enact laws, it does not mean that legal restrictions are unstable. First of all the election 
system may not allow any party to have a majority in the parliament. Second, a simple majority is not enough to 
change the articles of constitution. In both cases an agreement among different parties may be necessary which 
decreases the easiness to pass a parliament decision.
^2 Von Hagen (1991) shows that limits on fiscal variables, such as upper limits on deficits and debts, do not 
work well, since the governments find the way to circumvent these restraints.
33 See Bayomui and Sichengreen (1995) for empirical evidence from United States. Poterba (1994) argues 
that a challenging normative problem is to decide what is the optimal qualified majority required to abandon the 
balanced budget. This majority requirement should be increasing with the politico-economic forces that increase 
the incentive to run deficits, increasing in the predictability of revenues and expenditures, and decreasing the 
benefits of fiscal stabilization.
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4.1.2 Other Formal Institutions
Up to here I have talked about how political parties behave in a predatory manner 
when they gain public authority and how they impose their interests to losers. In this section I 
will concentrate on the ability of formal institutions -  first political then technical institutions 
— to create cooperation among the actors and mitigate coordination problem within the polity 
and the political system.
The concept of institutions plays a crucial role in classical decision models, which try 
to explain the relationship between state and polity. Remember that one of the conclusions of 
the Social Choice Theory is political instability -  shifting coalitions, vote trading and cycling 
over the outcome space. However in reality we face, more or less, stability in political arena. 
The reason asserted by the Positive Theory of Institutions is the role of political institutions 
which restricts the use of majority rule in social choices '^*. Political institutions may be in 
different forms, two of which arc extremely important: committees of the parliament and 
political parties.
Committees in the United States have been examined comprehensively and in detail 
by so many authors^^. Almost all these studies have revealed the positive impact of 
committees to the cooperation problem within the congress. They form a structure for the use 
of the majority rule. First, their presence put constraints on the behavior of self-interested 
legislators who act independent from each other. Second, by favoring commitments and 
durable deals they decrease the transaction costs that appear due to absence of any 
enforcement mechanism.
Command of committees highly depends on the political structure, such as duties and 
authority of the committee, recruitment and tenure of members, etc. It should be remembered 
that it is the participation of politicians that gives birth to committees. Therefore committees 
are sensitive to the interests of their members. Moreover it is not reasonable to assume that 
committees are able to operate independent of other representatives. Committee members 
may use their power in the bargaining process with other political actors to reach their goals 
in the issues which are out of their control. Therefore the presence of committees is not 
sufficient to prevent the predatory behavior of politicians.
Unfortunately political parties do not seem to be examined as extensive as 
committees, thanks to the dominance of American scholars in this context. Inman and Fitts 
(1990) explain the emergence of parties from an economic point of view. Uncertainty 
appeared due to unstable nature of coalitions leads to formation of organizations that ensure 
modest but certain gains rather than larger but uncertain captures. In this explanation
According to Мое, political institutions serve two different purposes: “On the one hand they help mitigate 
collective-action problems....On the other hand, [they] are also weapons of coercion and redistribution. They are 
the structural means by which political winners pursue their own interests, often at the great expense of politicai 
losers." (Мое [1990a] p.213). Мое defines the latter as the other side of the story neglected by the positive 
theory of institutions. For an empirical study of "the neglected side of the story" in United States, see Inman and 
Fitts (1990),
35 See W eingast and Marshall (1988), Ferejohn, and Shipan (1990), and Von Hagen (1992).
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universalism and parties coincides with each other: each member supports the preferences of 
the other, demanding a similar backing in return. However political parties have also another 
aspect that promotes the discipline among party members. They centralize the political 
authority preventing the dispersion of control by universalism. Note that interests of the 
representatives are usually peculiar to their constituencies^< \^ These relatively narrow interests 
are checked by the political parties who need to consider the interests of the majority to 
become incumbent '^7 p^rty lords have certain instruments to restrict the demands of their 
subordinates, such as control over access to elected offices, campaign organization and 
financing, patronage, use of party name as an information mechanising^ etc. The fear-of-party 
lords keeps the party members under controP^^ .
Nevertheless party authority does not have a perfect control over their members, 
because it is a relation of mutual interests. It is the local politicians that provide the 
connection between party and voters. Parties need, first, the information for particular 
demands of constituencies and second local associations and acquaintance of party members. 
Moreover party lords try to capture the support of party members, particularly party delegates, 
to conquer the command in the party and to preserve it. Sensitivity of party leaders to their 
subordinates decreases the disciplinary effect of parties.
Technical institutions represent the formal or quasi-formal organizations within state 
apparatus which operate interactively with political institutions. Central Bank is the primary 
example of such institutions. Although they are subordinate to political masters, they perform
According to Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) this is the reason of oversupply in geographically 
based public projects. Representatives do not internalize the effect of their proposal on the tax burden of the 
nation. However authors have one more argument: "...political institutions transform the economic basis of costs 
and benefits into political costs and benefits". Therefore a cooperative legislature cannot entirely remove the 
economic inefficiency by restricting the size of projects. The politically optimal level of expenditures is always 
higher than the economically optimal, unless the projects have no positive externality, such as indirect benefits 
to districts in term of expenditures for project inputs spent in or out of the constituency.
In that sense political parties of parliamentary systems play the same role as the presidency In presidential 
systems. Both widen the boundary of the Interests so that decisions are formulated on a broader perspective, 
instead of relatively narrow Interests. The reason of disciplinary role of parties Is described by Inman and Fitts 
(1990) as follows: When parliamentarians act independently, they completely internalize the benefit of public 
projects and leave the burden of their finance to others. However such an action carries the risk of lacking 
parliamentary approval. On the other hand when they are member of a political party, they decrease this risk by 
forming stable coalitions. However from now on they cannot act Independently . They should support their 
comrades in order to get a similar support from them. This means that once a project get approved, other party 
members will also get their projects whose finance will be provided by collectively. So party members cannot 
externalize the cost of their projects.
Party organization as an Information mechanism is extremely Important for voters and politicians. If 
Information is costless, there will be no need for politicians to be a party member, or for voters to observe party 
politics. However in real world not only the information gathering is costly, but also Its digestion needs an extra 
effort. Therefore voters need some kind of abstract to reduce the information cost to a reasonable level. Political 
parties serve as an information mechanism that provide necessary abstract to voters. Instead of gathering all 
sort of information to understand Intentions of politicians, voters use their parties as an Indication of their views. 
Naturally any abstraction also carries a particular cost due to the risk of its misunderstanding. The more stable is 
the politics, the lower will be the risk of abstraction.
See Inman and Fitts(1990) and Rogerson (1990).
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their functions being independent from political pressure to a certain extent. Autonomous 
structure of technical institutions restricts the action space of politicians and decreases the ex­
post payoffs of competition between political actors. However their success highly depends 
on to what extent they can resist the political pressures'* .^
Although institutions cannot totally prevent self-interested policies and cycles over the 
outcome space, they may be useful in defining the roles and legal rights of actors. In other 
words they differentiate legal rights of players in such a way that they enable the application 
of Coase Theorem in real life problems. This topic will be examined much closer later.
4.1.3 Co-optation
Co-optation means the participation of the ruled to the decision and execution 
mechanisms. Some examples of this participation may be observed in economic councils 
where representatives of labor unions and firms come together with bureaucrats and 
politicians to determine some economic policies and regulations. Primary purpose of co­
optation is to achieve agreement and understanding of all agents in the system. Since winners 
do not make their decisions independent from losers, competition among parties or groups can 
be resolved by agreement and mutual understanding. Moreover co-optation also serves to 
reduce the uncertainty of the future, which is another source of cooperation problem among 
players. Losers may gather information for fiiture policies and actions. However triumph of 
co-optation depends on the consent of the incumbent, because it means voluntary delegation 
of the authority to the losers.
4.1.4 Repeated Game Strategies
Repetition of the political game provides the commitment mechanism, which is 
lacking in one-shot games'* *. If one party does not hold its promise, although it could get a 
higher payoff during its tenure, it will be punished by losers in the subsequent elections. 
Hence the discounted payoff of deviation will be zero, which means that deviation from the 
promises has no additional payoff in the long run in comparison to holding promises. 
Similarly the repeated game strategies may also force opposing groups within the polity to 
restrict their demands for distributive politics. If one group does not fulfill its commitments, 
the agreement among the various groups will be terminated forever and all groups begin to 
behave in a predatory manner once they gain the public authority. Defection has another 
negative consequence: It deteriorates the reputation of the party or group and creates a 
notorious image. Lack of credibility increases the transaction cost of the defected side and 
provides an additional incentive for durable deals.
However if the voters are memoryless, then the punishment will continue only for a 
finite period. The defected party and/or group enjoys the short term benefit of violating the 
agreement until the next election. Then a punishment episode begins which lasts only for a
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) examine the positive impact of independent central banks in 
OECD countries.
'** Game Theory shows us that if the game is infinitely repeated, then cooperative behavior is the equiibrium 
outcome. It is also true for games repeated for a finite but indefinite period
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finite period and followed by establishment of a new agreement. Hence the discounted payoff 
of deviation does not vanish to zero. Indeed in the extreme case it is possible not to observe a 
punishment period at all. As a result, memoryless behavior of the electorates limits the length 
of repeated games and increases the attraction of defection.
There is one more deficiency: Although parties are organizations which are expected 
to live for an infinite horizon, individuals have a finite life. So, there is a conflict of interests: 
The length of optimization problem of a 'politician' differs from that of a party member. 
Prisoners' Dilemma among politicians may not be solved, since the discounted payoff of 
deviation does not go to zero. Political structure determines whether a politician will act 
individually or as a party member.
4.1.5 Coase Theorem
If 'property rights' of agents are defined properly, then necessary conditions for the 
application of Coase Theorem^^ may be provided. Legal restrictions and formal institutions 
are two basic tools that can be used to construct such an environment. Norms and ethic values 
also help to formulate the structure of the relationship. Once this structure is constructed and 
roles of agents are determined, bargaining process among agents becomes available. Instead 
of large but uncertain payoffs, all agents prefer to contact with each other and share smaller 
but certain gains. Winners abandon some of their uncertain shares and accept a modest 
payment from the losers. Losers concede to give up some of their interests to winners, instead 
of facing the risk of losing a greater share.
4.2 Principal-Agent Relation Within the Political System, and 
Between the Polity and the Politics
As we discussed before, the struggle of individuals is not completed once they seize 
public authority. In fact this is the beginning of another struggle, i.e. the Principal-Agent 
problem between voters and incumbent. Fear of voters is that the incumbent, once elected, 
will pursue his own policies in the expense of their constituencies, though he is supposed to 
represent their interests.
Most of the mechanisms that we diseussed before may be used to attenuate this 
problem, because the reason of both problems is almost same: the execution of public 
authority. However to mitigate the negative effect of insufficient monitoring and imperfect 
information, other mechanisms should be constructed:
Voting Mechanism 
Formal Structure of Polities 
Competition Among Rivals 
Co-optation and Voluntarily Organizations 
Repeated Game Strategies
42 According to Coase Theorem if costless negotiation is possible, property rights are well-specified, and 
redistribution does not affect marginal values, then the allocation of resources will be identical, whatever the 
allocation of legal rights. Moreover the allocation of resources will be efficient, so the problem of externality will 
disappear.
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4.2.1 Voting Mechanism:
Voting is the most important mechanism for electorates to provide necessary 
motivation to the agent to act in the desired way. It represents both the 'carrot' and the 'stick' to 
keep the agent under control. Voting may be in different forms, but it has principally two 
purposes; To determine representatives of the polity who will hold the government offices, 
and to decide particular policies and government actions. The first category involves 
presidential elections, legislature elections, municipality elections, etc. Whereas the 
referendum, the true majority voting instance, belongs to the second category.
In representative democracies public authority is used not directly by polity, but in an 
indirect manner by their representatives. The channel between the desires of society and 
government actions is not perfect due to this indirect relationship. Voting mechanism used to 
elect representatives is an imperfect solution to the social choice problem. First, since the 
elections are discrete in time, they cannot solve continuous problems between the principal 
and the agent. Second, elections are arranged on general issues. It is an aggregate voting, in 
which more than one policy is on the spot. Even the electorate does not enjoy some policies of 
a particular party, he can vote for it if it is still better in aggregate.
Referendum, on the other hand, is used for particular policies and usually implies a 
yes-no type decision. So it fits Arrow's conditions which are necessary for the application of 
majority voting'^  ^ iiowever since referendum is costly and time consuming, it is not feasible 
and efficient to use it in every case a government decision is needed.
4.2.2 Formal Structure of Politics
1 divide the formal structure regarding to the execution of public authority into two 
categories: Legal restrictions and political institutions. Legal restrictions may provide 
necessary information mechanisms'*^ to monitor the government actions. However since their 
structures are constructed by the politicians, they may not be sufficient to serve as a perfect 
mechanism. Similarly effectiveness of these restrictions is subject to independence of courts 
from political intervention. Another negative effect of legal restrictions is loss of flexibility. 
Note that in the principal-agent relation, it is the agent who is expertise and more information 
about the environment. Putting legal restrictions to the actions of the agent may lead 
inefficient policies, since the agent is unable to use his expertise in the subjecH^.
Political institutions as information and monitoring mechanisms are present in almost 
all political structures. Government is controlled by the parliament and committees, party 
lords by party direction boards and conventions, legislatures by party delegates, and so on. 
Usually the monitoring task of these institutions are enhanced by legal rights and enforcement
43 Arrow (1950).
44 Budgeting process and question hours in the parliament are some examples of these information 
mechanisms. However a poorly informed budget such as miscalculation of revenue and expenditure 
expectations, may enable the misuse of funds and deviation from forecast.
45 See Von Hagen (1992) for an analysis of budgetng process and Bayomui and Sichengreen (1995) for
emprcal evdence from Unted States.
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power. For example they can employ or/and dismiss agents. Since their members are elected 
by the polity, electorates can perform the monitoring of agents in an indirect way through 
these representative institutions. It is more efficient to delegate this authority to a smaller 
group ol people who are specialized in this task, because the community may find it too 
costly and time consuming to perform it by themselves.
However there are two difficulties with this authorizing. First, it creates another 
principal-agent problem between the one who delegate his authority and the deputy who is 
authorized. Second, the deputy who is supposed to monitor the policies of the agent is, 
formally or informally, is subordinate to that agent. The first problem provokes asymmetric 
information and ineffective monitoring similar to the ones which we try to get rid of Whereas 
the second problem induces another fear-of-agent dilemma, because deputies are aware of the 
fact that the agent can use the authority to make their welfare worse off. It is no use leaving 
the monitoring task to people who are vulnerable to the actions of the one being monitored.
4.2.3 Competition Among Rivals:
Competition may provide necessary information mechanism to electorates. 
Competitors inform electorates about themselves to capture the support of the community and 
reveal the actions and intentions of their opponents to deteriorate their reputation. Being 
informed about the 'quality' and the policies of players, the electorate can delegate the 
authority without falling into trap of adverse selection or moral hazard problem.
There are three failures of this mechanism: One is the contradiction of information and 
the other one is the cooperation among the opponents. Information mechanism provided by 
the political competition is not reliable due to multiple information sources. Each rival reveals 
particular information which is more beneficial for their interest. So, only a part of 'true' 
information is announced to public opinion. Moreover opponents are not needed to be honest. 
They may provide 'false' information to electorates to get their support. Therefore although 
competition solves the problem of lack of information, it creates another problem: Excessive 
amount of contradictory information.
Competition of opponents does not always lead to a self-control in political arena. To 
check one's action is costly and to be checked by another has a certain risk. If the benefit of 
monitoring is less than its cost and risk, political actors may prefer collusion to competition. 
They create certain out-of-control zones which will be free of any political scrutiny. This is 
very similar to 'tit-for-tat' strategies of the repeated games, where parties behave in a 
cooperative manner threatening potential defectors with punishment period.
A third shortcoming is that competition among parties prevent the formation of policy 
choices independent of other parties. Politicians cannot isolate themselves from the influence 
of their opponents. From time to time they should re-arrange their position in political arena 
to deteriorate the prestige of opponents or to increase their supply price in the public opinion. 
So, they may find it necessary to prefer policies different from their party preferences or
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promises. Parties manipulate fiscal variables to affect the policies of future governments^, to 
deteriorate the image of opponents^ and to increase their re-election probability, not to reach 
optimal allocation of public resources.
4.2.4 Co-optation and Voluntarily Organizations:
Co-optation provides a useful information mechanism to the principal in his relation 
with the agent. Being an integrated part of decision making and execution structure, people 
can get inside information about actions and motivations of politicians. This minimizes the 
control problem in two ways: First, the electorate can understand whether the politician will 
commit to his promises or not. Second, such an information mechanism may provide 
necessary motivation to deter self-interested politicians from the political system. Moral 
hazard problem will be solved by the former, and adverse selection by the latter.
There is one question unsolved in co-optation: How can the principal enforce his 
desires, once he understands that the agent deviates from his commitment? Note that co­
optation only equips electorates with an information mechanism; it cannot enforce actions. 
Hence in addition to the necessity for tolerance of the incumbent which has discussed before, 
co-optation has another drawback which decreases its effectiveness. Co-optation can only 
detect moral hazard and adverse selection problems; it cannot totally get rid of the problem.
Unlike co-optation, voluntary organizations provide information from outside. They 
are informal arrangements founded by groups to protect and propagate certain interests. 
Individuals do not participate to decision and execution mechanisms of incumbents, but 
construct their own organizations to observe and affect these mechanisms.
Similar to co-optation, voluntary organizations have a limited enforcement power. 
Another drawback of organizations is that the occurrence of free-rider problem. Membership 
is both time-consuming and costly. On the other hand benefit is (partially) non-excludable, 
regardless of membership. So people would like to enjoy its benefit without actively 
participating to its cost. It is the primary obstacle which prevents the foundation of many 
voluntary organizations.
Another drawback is that due to free-rider problem these organizations are founded 
and/or operated by professionals who are ready to devote much of their resources — both 
monetary funds and time endowment — for the achievement of their particular interests. So, 
voluntary organizations serve for the purposes of special interest groups. This specialization 
will, first, decreases the scope of the issues covered by those organizations. Second, it 
decreases the reliability of the information provided by those groups. Third, it reduces the
Alesina and Tabellini (1989) explain how government, using public debt, can affect allocation of publis 
resources. Perron and Svensson (1989) construct a model where parties have disagreement not about the 
composition of public spending, but its level.
See Milesi-Ferretti (1995) to understand how an inflation-averse incumbent may deviate from his policy 
preferences about inflation to use the fear of bond-holders against inflation-prone opponent. Also refer to Milesi- 
Ferretti (1993) for a simlar study on the choce of exchange-rate regime in an economy with inflation.
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independence of these organizations, because they can prefer to cooperate with the incumbent 
to accomplish particular interests.
4.2.5 News Media:
The key aspect of news media is its enormous ability to attract a widespread attention 
in public opinion to its news. Public agenda is determined by media to a large extent. It is one 
of the most notable means in the hands of polity which plays a crucial role as an information 
mechanism. News media finds two solutions to the asymmetric information problem: First, it 
collects, processes, and presents excessive amount information to the polity in a reduced form 
so that cost of information gathering is significantly reduced. Second, it presents it 
sufficiently simple to enable ordinary citizens to perceive the information.
However its power to attract mass audiences also represents a problem to news media: 
the danger of 'selling the attraction''**. It can be used in the hands of pressure groups as a 
means of capturing particular interests by misinforming or not informing the society. Another 
problem is that summarized information provided by media may be even too costly to be 
consumed by individuals. So, still a very limited subset of polity will benefit from the service 
of news media and usually particular groups which have a special interest on outcomes will 
benefit more.
4.2.6 Repeated Game Strategies:
If it was possible to observe quality and actions of the agent, the principal's task would 
be simple. Select only the 'good' politician, and punish him if he does not follow the interests 
of electorates. Nevertheless electorates usually lack sufficient information to reach their first- 
best choice. If the frequency of exchange increases, this problem tends to disappear. In 
repeated transactions, electorates learn the quality of politicians and their motivations. 
Politicians may develop reputations for being sincere representatives of the interests of 
electorates. They make promises and give warranties to signal that they are 'good'. These 
promises tight their hands when they become incumbent. Any deviation from commitments 
provokes a decline in reputation and trustworthiness of politicians. So, it becomes more costly 
to persuade voters in the next elections.
Significance of repeated game strategies depends very much on the characteristics of 
polity. Electorates may be myopic or memoryless about the promises and actions of 
politicians. Even they are perfect observers, it may be difficult to perceive complexities of 
government actions. This makes it impossible to judge the behavior of political actors. A third 
deficiency is that monitoring the outcome may not be an indicator of the quality of political 
actions. Success of economic policies depends on random effects coming from the 
environment, as well as policies and their implementation of policies. Since these factors are 
not in the control of the incumbent, electorates cannot understand how much of the failure is 
due to uncontrollable factors, and how much is due to inadequate politicians or policy 
choices.
Levine and Forrence (1990).
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5. CONCLUSION
111 this chapter I have tried to present a comprehensive framework to understand 
interactions between the polity and political arena. First, I divide these transactions into three 
fields: i.) Within the polity, ii.) Within the politics, and iii.) Between the polity and the 
politics. Since the bureaucracy is not considered as a separate and independent actor, it takes 
no part. Then I have classified the problems seen in these fields into two categories: First, 
eooperation, coordination, and commitment problems whieh occurred among groups 
competing to impose their interests on others. Second, problems observed in Principal-Agent 
relationship between politicians and electorates, and between party leaders and party 
members.
After constructing the framework of the study, it is time to fill the gaps: I have 
examined the reasons of these problem. In fact, problems observed in the first and second 
fields have many eommon reasons: First of all the nature of public authority. Public authority 
provides such powerful instruments to the incumbent that players prefer to compete for the 
capture of this power and its discretionary use, instead of cooperation with their opponents, 
coordination of actions, and committing to previous deals. As power of public authority over 
the society increases, competition among players gets much more severe. Of course it is the 
existence of conflicting interests which triggers and amplifies the problem. Heterogeneity, 
fragmentation, and polarization strengthen the degree of conflict. A third reason common in 
both fields is the information problems. Whether uncertainty is related to the future or the 
opponent or the individuals themselves, the result is same: suboptimal deeisions in the 
absence of necessary information.
Although many of the problems observed in the relationship between the polity and 
politics emerge due to similar reasons, there is one additional feature, that is multidimensional 
preferences. If there is only one variable in objective funetion, then the first-best is obvious. 
But in case of more than one variable, it is not possible to choose first-best preferences for 
each of them. The principal should be pleased by an agent which behaves well in certain 
crucial issues.
Then I have presented possible solution alternatives and also concentrated on their 
applicability. Again most of these alternatives are similar: to create mechanisms between the 
players to provide endogenous or exogenous solutions to the problems. These mechanisms are 
used either to enable bargaining process, or to reveal information, or to punish individuals 
who behave 'bad'. There may exist exogenous measures as well as endogenous ones: limiting 
action space of players either by legal restrictions or by informal norms and customs. 
However neither of these mechanisms are useful, unless most of players believe in their 
usefulness. It is always possible to find ways to circumvent these measures and if sufficient 
number of players do so, then it becomes no longer optimal be complaint for the others. 
Remember that the reason of creating such mechanisms is to solve this problem. So, we reach 
another 'impossibility theorem' similar to Arrow's.
CHAPTER TWO ]
POLITICS, SOCIETY AND THE 
BUREAUCRACY
1. INTRODUCTION
So far it is assumed that politics is a mutual relation between politicians and citizens. 
Voters elect their representatives who will serve to their interests. Politicians respond to the 
demand of their supporters to implement their policy preferences, or just to be elected. 
Everyone has a conflict with each other: There is a fight among the citizens to seize the state 
apparatus by authorizing their own representatives. Politicians compete to be authorized and 
capture public authority. Citizens do not trust their representatives who may forget the reason 
of their election and follow their own interests once they are elected. Party leaders worry 
about conflicting demand of party members and society. What we get at the end is a 
democracy full of collective action, commitment and coordination problems.
However political relation is not so straightforward. Politics is not solely a set of 
contractual agreements between citizens and politicians, or party leaders and party members. 
First, state does not center around the incumbent who makes all deeision for state and is 
endowed with necessary tools to implement his preferences. Second, state who is not simply a 
black box under the service of politicians that produces optimal choices automatically subject 
to orders of the incumbent. Third, everyone is aware of these facts.
"Consider how a public agency emerges. The relevant partners to the 'political 
contractthen, are politicians and interest groups. What their contract creates 
is a new> organization, the public agency, that they will not be a part o f it. The 
agency consists o f a new set o f participants, public bureaucrats.
A new public agency is literally a new actor on the political scene. It has its 
own interests, which may diverge from those o f its creators, and it typically 
has resources - expertise, delegated authority.... The political game is different 
now: there are more players and more interest to he accommodated." ■
From now on politicians and citizens should not only concern about the struggle with 
each other, but also realize that they should also spend an extra effort to impose their wills on 
bureaucrats, in case of a dispute between interests.
In this section I will proceed as follows: First, I will discuss the problems which are 
faced by politicians in their relationship with the bureaucracy. Disputes within politics will
1 Wloe (1991) p. 121.
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also be considered in this part so that 'a general equilibrium model', rather than 'a partial 
equilibrium model' will be constructed. Then 1 will examine the available mechanisms to 
control the bureaucracy, their application and drawbacks. In the last part I will study the 
positive impact of the bureaucracy to the relationship between the political actors and the 
voters.
2. PROBLEMS BETWEEN POLITICIANS AND THE 
BUREAUCRACY
From the politicians' point of view, the question of political control of agencies is a 
straightforward principal-agent problem: elected officials who create administrative agencies 
must worry about future shirking by bureaucrats. Politicians lack the necessary expertise to do 
the job on their own, they do not have enough information about the characteristics and 
motivation of the agent, and they are unable to observe and judge their actions.
In this part 1 will, first, analyze the problems between the elected officials and the 
bureaucracy using a general principal-agent framework. Then politics will be embodied on 
that analyze to enlarge the scope.
2. / Principal-Agent Framework
2.1.1 Adverse Selection
One problem for politicians is to select 'right' kind of people to public service. 
Selection of agents is based on two criteria which may contradict with each other. One is the 
political incentives, i.e. the agent should share the interests of their political masters, or at 
least comply to those interests. They should not diverge from the target to pursue their own 
preferences. The second one is the effective organization: the agent should make his job 
properly. He should produce the optimal output given the objectives of politicians and the 
environment. Unfortunately it may not be possible to aehieve a selection which fulfill both of 
the criteria simultaneously. Individuals who have the same preferences with the incumbent 
may not be very competent in public service; or those who are ingenious may have different 
political preferences.
Above we assume that the incumbent has full information about the characteristic of 
candidates and can make a selection based on this information. However this may not be the 
case: usually people prefer to hide their individual-specific properties. It may not be possible 
to observe neither their incentives and preferences nor their productivity level. So, the 
incumbent faces the danger of choosing 'wrong' kind of people, if he constructs a selection 
mechanism based on the average characteristics of the individuals^. "Adverse selection derives 
from unohservability o f the information, beliefs, and values on which the decisions o f others 
are hased"^.
2 Average information is misleading indication of actual quality of the goods (Akerlof [1970]).
3 Miller and Мое (1985) p.173.
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There is one additional feature of public service which makes things worse for the 
principal. In private market, if the employer discovers the characteristics of the agent after his 
recruitment and if they contradict with the preferences of the firm, then it is possible for the 
employer to dismiss the agent — after paying the necessary compensation or without any cost. 
In public service the agent enjoys a high degree of job security, which disables the review of 
employment contract to get rid of 'bad' agent.
2.1.2 Moral Hazard
Like their counterparts in private sector, elected officials concern about the actions of 
the agent: he can deviate from the objectives of the principal, pursue his own interests, and 
worst of all the principal is doubtful whether he is working or shirking. Furthermore even they 
observe the action of the agent, they cannot be sure whether it is the best way of doing it. So, 
there are two problems that worry the principal: First, what is the agent doing? Second, is 
there another way to do it better?
Politicians are not expert of public policies, therefore they do not have full information 
about the actions of the agent and the environment. It is possible to get information by 
devoting some resources for that purpose. However they do not only find it costly to monitor 
the behavior of the agencies, but also find it costly even to inform themselves of the relevant 
issues and to determine which outcome among many is 'best'. The result is bureaucratic 
drifH. Administrative agencies will act in contrary to the interests and wills of the elected 
officials.
Reason of bureaucratic drift is dependence of the principal to the agent for the 
formulation and implementation of policies. Due to uncertainty of future and cost of decision 
making, the principal cannot define all courses of actions based on all possible contingencies. 
If the incumbent is endowed with necessary properties — knowledge, expertise, computational 
skills — then why does he need an agent at all? Politicians, lacking necessary properties, such 
as knowledge, expertise, etc., will face both economic and political cost of choosing the 
'wrong' course of action. Note that all decisions also carry the cost of benefit foregone by not 
doing it another way, i.e. opportunity cost. Every decision may create some losers as well as 
beneficiaries. Decision makers should bear the risk of having an opportunity cost higher than 
the benefit of decision. Assigning a risk to a risk averse individual is equivalent to imposing a 
cost. So, the higher is the number of situations which need a decision, the higher will be the 
cost imposed to politician.
Peculiar characteristic of personal management which was described above also 
multiplies the moral hazard problem. In private sector it is possible to punish the non- 
compliant behavior of the agent. However in public service job security of the civil servants 
makes the punishment possibility an empty threat in most cases.
^  McCubbins, Mathew, and Weingast (1987).
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2,2 Legislative Drift
In the previous section we have analyzed the relation between elected officials and the 
bureaucracy using the classical tools of game theory. However in public service there is 
another kind of problem which worry politicians: Legislative drift, i.e. nullification of the 
previous policies and actions by the incumbent in the future which has different interests and 
preferences. This political problem affects the principal-agent relationship and provokes 
further deviation of actors from the optimal behavior.
As we have discussed before there are certain concepts that are peculiar to political 
organizations. These are public authority, political uncertainty and political compromise^. 
Due to the nature of politics, the group who captures the public authority has a discretionary 
power of using it for its own interests. So, whoever gets the power can change the rules of the 
game, rearrange contract of the state with citizens, and pursue policies different from the 
previous ones. Moreover there is no political certainty, i.e. the incumbent today may not know 
who will be in office tomorrow. I'his leads to the application of protective measures to 
safeguards the present arrangements. Furthermore the incumbent may be forced to give some 
concessions to the loser in order to achieve his objectives. The political structure may throw 
up so many obstacles to the incumbent that compromise among opposition forces is usually 
necessary if the incumbent wants to achieve anything at all.
Thus the incumbent should not only take measures against adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems of the agent, but also protect himself from the uncertainty of the future and 
bargain with the opponent to apply these measures. Unfortunately all of these goals cannot be 
achieved simultaneously. There is a trade-off between the legislative and bureaucratic drift 
which presents politicians a 'legislative possibility frontier' that represents a certain 
combination of both<^ .
What the incumbent demands from the bureaucracy is an effective organization which 
follows the interests of its boss. Due to problems that emerge in such a principal-agent set-up 
he should be endowed with necessary enforcement mechanism which creates sufficient 
incentives to agents to act in accordance with the orders. This mechanism gives the power to 
the principal to control the agency^. However if the incumbent today can manipulate the 
bureaucracy for its own interests, so can do the future incumbent. It is possible to maximize 
the benefits of today, only at the expense of benefits of tomorrow. This may not cause much 
problem if political groups are sure about the continuance of their authority in the future. But 
election outcomes can never be anticipated with certainty and it is always possible to face a 
change in voter preferences which leads to a change in the identity of incumbent. So, the 
principal finds it necessary to restrict himself from imposing a high control on the agent. It 
may be possible but not optimal for the incumbent to create a mechanism which solves the 
principal-agent problems with the bureaucracy. Instead of choosing the first best — a perfectly
5 See Moe(1984,1990a, 1990b, 1991).
^Shepsle (1992).
^ The controlling mechanisms will be analyzed in the next section in detail.
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compliant and effective agent -- he chooses the second best -  a partially compliant agency 
who obeys the order in most cases, but not all — and devotes his resources to protect his 
agency.
Even when the incumbent does not care about his future benefits, it may be possible 
but still not optimal to impose his preferences over the bureaucracy. Political pressure or 
formal rules may necessitate a bargaining process with the opponent. The incumbent may 
hesitate to make a partisan appointment due to negative attitude of the public opinion. A 
compromise may be needed to get the approval of the senate or the president. He has to find a 
middle ground with the opponent in the parliament to pas the new structural rules of personal 
management. All these requirements prevent a complete authority of the ineumbent and 
restrict his ability in dealing with the bureaucracy.
3. CONTROLLING MECHANISMS
One argument is that if all civil servants care about the public interest, then there will 
be little need for the controlling mechanisms. However at this point there are several 
questions to ask: How can we develop such a norm of attitude among the civil servants? Is the 
motivation of the agents an exogenous or an endogenous variable? Does a solution to the 
'Moral Hazard' problem imply a harmony between the interests of the bureaucrats and the 
politicians? To whom the bureaucrats will obey if they have contradictory policy proposals 
with their political superiors? Note that the presence of agents who care about social welfare 
is not a sufficient condition to have a bureaucratic consent to politicians. It is possible to 
observe a bureaucratic drift, even if both parties desire to promote the public interest. One 
reason is ideological differences. Another reason is uncertainty of the future. In a world of 
imperfect information everyone has to make some expectations about the 'unknown', based on 
some prior information and beliefs that may not match with others.
The ageney problem appears as a result of such a conflict where agents are not 
compliant to the wills of politicians. There are several possible solutions to the agency 
problem;
3.1 External Labor Markets
For some agents public service is a career opportunity which is expected to last until 
their retirement. For others it is an investment for future career opportunities in the private 
sector. Whatever the incentives of a civil servant, they all keep in mind the possibility of a 
transition to private labor market, either as a result of a deliberate decision or thanks to a 
political or an economic necessity. Therefore during their tenure, they also consider the effect 
of their actions on private market.
There are two conditions necessary in order to observe the influence of the external 
job on the behaviors of agents. The first one is discussed above: agents should care about the 
private market. The second one is the extra benefit of being a private agent. Public service 
offers so many advantages to its employees, some of which are tangible while others are 
nonphysical: Retirement pension, job security, status and prestige, etc. Private market should
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compensate the loss of a civil servant who gives up all these benefits. The primary and most 
direct way of attracting a public agent is wage differences between the sectors.
Presence of private job market affects the actions of an agent in two ways: One is that 
the agent will try to increase his supply price. Value of an agent may increase either by 
building a reputation based on good performance in the public administration or by making 
regulations even more complex and mysterious so that the return to job-specific knowledge 
becomes significant. Therefore the net result is ambiguous: On one hand the agent will desire 
to maximize his performance, on the other hand he will create puzzles which can only be 
solved by themselves. Efficiency of actions depends on the factor which is dominant. 
However one fact is obvious: The agent wants to expand the scope of his authority to attract 
the attention of private organizations and to make them dependent on his expertise.
The second way is to pursue the interests of potential employers. Hence agents turn 
out to be more sensitive and responsive to the changes of private interests. The inevitable 
result of this sensitivity is that the bureaucracy will lose its autonomy facing the particularistic 
demand of pressure groups. Another result is more acceptable for politicians. Once a policy is 
set, the agency will bound the implementation of this policy. Fluctuations of policies and 
unstable decisions decrease the price of the bureaucracy in the eyes of the private sector due 
to lack of commitment and credibility. Frequent shifts act as a discount factor which reduces 
the value of'buying' agents to follow particular policy**.
3.2 Fire Alarm Oversight
Politicians may choose to establish a system of rules, procedures and informed 
practices that enable interested groups to examine administrative decisions and to seek 
remedies from agencies. Hence politicians shift the task of monitoring to the interest groups. 
Instead of a direct control of the agency, they only respond to 'fire alarm' of third parties**. For 
politicians, the benefit of this kind of oversight is obvious: They will reduce the participation 
cost by leaving the burden of information gathering to interest groups. Moreover third parties 
may be more effective in monitoring the agency. They can hire necessary expertise to form 
judgments or to challenge agency decisions and performance.
However fire alarm oversight has certain defects as well. First of all it is a shift of 
responsibility: when the participation cost of the politician decreases, this cost will be shifted 
to interest groups. So the politician may find nobody to use alarm mechanism. Second defect 
is that due to participation cost only the groups affected by the agency action will respond, as 
long as the incentives are large enough to cover the cost. Hence the incentive triggered the fire 
alarm is biased towards the interests of people who afford to pay the cost. Moreover these 
groups can use their power to deceive the politician. Because the fire alarm oversight is, in 
fact, the delegation of monitoring authority, we face a moral hazard problem: the people who 
have the necessary information may use it for their own interests deceiving the politician who 
does not have this information. The politician is aware of this problem and he knows that
Sshepsle (1992).
 ^McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), Lupia and McCubbins (1994).
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similarity of preferences increases the probability of a true fire alarm. So, politicians assign a 
greater weight to the groups who have the same interests. However if many groups trigger the 
alarm simultaneously and there is a greater range of conflicting comments and evidence, then 
the politician will unable to differentiate 'good' and 'bad' calls. This is especially the case if the 
politician has no prior information regarding to the preferences of the third parties. Therefore 
the eifectiveness of the fire alarm as a monitoring device loses its power; The agency may 
find an argument to justify his action.
3.3 Police Patrol Oversight
One way to monitor the actions of the agency is centralized and direct oversight by the 
politician. Although this is the most effective way of gathering information regarding the 
actions of the agency, the politicians may find it infeasible to perform controlling tasks due to 
its participation cost, especially time consumed for that purpose* '^.
Having information about actions of an agent may not be sufficient to affect its 
behavior. Note that risk of noncompliance for the civil servants is a function of two variables. 
One is the scope and effectiveness of monitoring which are determined by resources devoted 
to that purpose. The other one is the penalty of noncompliant behavior. Even an elfective 
monitoring may not be sufficient to deter noncompliance, if the punishment capability of the 
politician is limited.
In addition to above factors which decreases the effectiveness of police patrol 
oversight, its effectiveness may not be desired even by politicians. One reason of this 
reluctance is that increasing influence of the political control may lead to nullification of the 
policies in the future. If the oversight is effective enough to affect the agency, then the agency 
will be very sensitive to the preferences of the incumbent. Unstable policies decrease the 
value of politicians to the constituencies. Another reason is negative externality which 
damages the reputation of the politician. Misbehavior of the agent also affects politicians, 
especially when the voters are unable to differentiate the person responsible for the action.
3.4 Appointment o f Senior Bureaucrats
The direct way of affecting the actions of an agency is to select employees according 
to the preferences of candidates. Any impersonal selection criteria — like general and merit 
based entrance examinations — carry the risk of choosing wrong kind of people. Obviously it 
is not possible or needed to select all agents from top to bottom. Hence appointment of senior 
bureaucrats is the most direct solution to the moral hazard and adverse selection problem.
However it is not possible to observe all characteristics of candidates. So, even a direct 
selection will be based on asymmetric information. This means that neither of those problems 
stated above can be vanished completely. Second, the objective of senior bureaucrats does not 
necessarily match with the medium and lower level agents. It is the people in the top level 
who determine the effectiveness and the direction of the policies. However without the active
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), Lupia and McCubbins (1994).
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cooperation of agency staff, top managers fece both hidden information problem and 
ineffective implementation of policies. Note that usually salaries and promotion of agents are 
not determined by their superiors, .lob security of civil servants further increase the 
probability of disobedient behavior.
Another problem is regarding to the feasibility of the spoil system, i.e. appointments 
based on the decision of single interest groups. Some appointments may require the approval 
of parliament, president, or cabinet. In this case veto threat prevents the appointment of 
candidates with easily identifiable positions at the extreme. So, only those people who 
succeed in masking certain part of their characteristics will be chosen as candidates. That will, 
in turn, increase the adverse selection problem. Only candidates to survive the selection 
process will be those whose bias is difficult to predict.
Although direct appointment of senior bureaucrats increases the power of politicians 
to control the bureaucracy, they may restrict themselves to prevent the use of that power by 
the opponent in the future.
3.5 Direct or Restrict Actions o f the Agency
There would be no monitoring problem, if the politician could perform all 
government actions with their own capacity. Although it is not feasible in most of the issues, 
in few cases the politician may prefer to direct actions which are chosen selectively due to 
scarce resources..
Restriction of agency's action space is more preferred way of controlling the behavior 
of agents. These restrictions may be either in terms of predetermined set of rules, procedures 
and regulations which define the goals of the agency, decision criteria, decision making 
process, and execution phases of policies, or in terms of budget restrictions which specify 
what should be spent to which tasks by whom. Neither of them can perfectly control the 
agency, because it is not possible to foresee all types of situations before their occurrences. 
The agent continues to enjoy some delegation and autonomy in the boundary of speeified 
rules. On the other hand these restrictions carry the risk of restricting the agents beyond a 
level where it becomes very difficult to response to future changes in the environment. It will 
be more damaging if these restrictions are based on wrong or insufficient information. It is 
both unlikely and costly to define all courses of actions based on all possible contingencies. 
Another problem is about the preparation of restrictions. By whom will these restrictions will 
specified? If the incumbent is endowed with necessary properties — knowledge, expertise, 
computational skills — then why does he need an agent at all? Politicians, lacking these 
properties, will face both economic and political cost of choosing the 'wrong' course of 
action. Note that all decisions also carry the cost of benefit foregone by not doing it another 
way, i.e. opportunity cost. Every decision may create some losers as well as people who 
benefit from these decisions. Decision makers should bear the risk of having an opportunity 
cost higher than the benefit of decision. Assigning a risk to a risk averse individual is 
equivalent to imposing a cost. So, the higher is the number of situations which need a 
decision, the higher will be the cost imposed to politician. One should also note that such
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restrictions also act as a constraint for the future politicians, as well as the bureaucracy. So, 
agencies become out of democratic control.
3.6 Delegation
Above I have analyzed the consequences of telling officials what to do and leaving 
little action space for their independent action. This structure may be useful if the policy goals 
and the their achievement are simple. However usually such restrictions are not suited to the 
complex policy problems which are the usual case in public sector. While the incumbent has 
the political power to impose his interests on officials, he lacks knowledge of what to tell 
people to do. So, an alternative option is to specify policies in general terms and delegate 
authority to the officials to fill the details in accordance with the necessities of the conditions. 
The factors affecting the degree of delegation are twofold: First, technical reasons, i.e. the 
relation between the incumbent and the bureaucracy. Second, the political reasons, i.e. the 
relation of the incumbent with the opponent and the polity.
What makes the delegation attractive for the incumbent's point of view is, primarily, to 
prevent suboptimal decisions resulting form incomplete information. Since the officials have 
more information and expertise than the politicians, they can do what the incumbent is unable 
to do himself Another benefit is that delegation may provide a commitment mechanisms for 
the agent to the policies of the government. Because the agents participate to the policy 
making process, at least to fill the details, they find themselves responsible for the success of 
decisions in which they also take part an important role. Preferences of the agent and the 
principal are compatible with each other''.
Along with technical reasons of delegation, there exists also political factors which 
backs the delegation. One is the 'shift the responsibility rationale'‘2. The principal is aware of 
the fact that every decision creates some losers, as well as beneficiaries. Moreover every 
decision has a corresponding opportunity cost which represents the benefit foregone by not 
doing it in another way. If the pressure of losers and the opportunity cost of deciding are very 
high, then the principal may choose to leave 'tough' decisions to the bureaucracy so that if 
everything goes wrong or there is some protests from interest groups, the principal may blame 
the agent. Another political reason of delegation is to limit the ability of subsequent 
governments to change policies. Delegation puts restrictions on the discretionary power of the 
incumbent, both today and in the future. Flence political uncertainty may also lead to 
delegation of authority, if the incumbent concerns about a radical policy shift of the opponent.
However delegation also brings certain costs to the principal: One is observed if the 
principal and the agent have divergent interests. The agent, being authorized by the 
incumbent, may pursue policies which will maximize his own objective function. Hence 
unlike the case examined above, delegation provokes additional agency cost due to conflicts
As Ross (1973) points out the Pareto efficient incentive system is one in which the agent's fee is linear with 
the principal's earnings. We can reach the same conclusion if we assume that achievement of preferences 
provides a utility to both actors,
12 Fiorina (1982).
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of interests. The other problem is that if the agent has a status-quo-biased attitude then 
delegation will increase the time span of decision making process and effectiveness of 
policies'3. Hence a broad delegation is an indication that the incumbent is confident of his 
ability to influence and control the agency ex post''*. Another problem of delegation is that the 
interest groups may not be fooled so easily by politicians who shift the responsibility of 
decision making to the officials'^. It is the politicians who are responsible for the actions of 
government, including its agencies.
3.7 Internal Labor Market
Internal labor market represents a set of rules and working conditions which covers 
the personnel management inside the bureaucratic structure. Legislators have fashioned the 
employment contracts to reduce agency problems that threaten their relationship with their 
constituencies. Institutional features create or undermine incentives for bureaucratic efficiency 
and responsiveness.
Before proceeding to the various aspects of internal labor market let me begin by 
suggesting a reasonable answer to the following question: Why do legislators hesitate to 
create a bureaucratic structure that serves to their interests to the best of its ability? Obviously 
this question implicitly implies the reason of disappearance of (pure) patronage system in 
modern democracies. Therefore it is fair to understand, first, what the patronage system is.
3.7.1 Patronage System
The primary feature of patronage system is that there is almost no restriction on the 
politic manipulation of the bureaucracy. Naturally such a system creates lots of positive 
selection and incentive mechanisms which promote the interests of politicians. The 
appointment of 'our men' will decrease the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
Therefore need for monitoring will disappear which decreases the cost of government. Since it 
is easy to dismiss bureaucrats, the punishment threat of politicians will be credible and 
justified. So an incentive for compliance will exist. Also competitive civil servants can be 
altered easily. However neither of these advantages have been sufficient to sustain patronage 
system. In most countries the merit system have gradually taken the place of patronage.
There are several factors of which destroy the applicability of patronage system. First, 
positive incentives are not so powerful to create an 'ideal' bureaucrat type who is both 
respectful to his political masters and acting to the best of his ability to promote the interests 
of the politician. All characteristics of a candidate are not observable. It is not possible to 
monitor actions of an agent without any cost. This gives the agent an opportunity to follow his 
own personal objectives. Moreover obedience of the agent is not an exogenous factor, but 
depends on political factors. The lower the probability of reelection of his patron, the lower 
the risk of a non-compliant behavior. Scandals and corruption associated with such an
13DeGroot(1988).
Macey (1992). 
15|Vioe (1990b).
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institutional arrangement turns out to be harmful for politicians. The benefits simply do not 
cover the cost.
3.7.2 Merit System - The Politician's Point of View
Merit system has two basic features. One is that the recruitment is based on some 
objective criterion which is used for all candidates regardless of their identity. Entrance 
requirements may favor certain candidates with particular characteristics, but their application 
is impersonal, not individual-specific. The other feature is that performance and the quality of 
the agent is an important factor which affects promotion and tenure. This does not mean that 
there is no other factor and performance is the only criterion. The degree of influenee depends 
on the structure of the internal labor market structure.
Merit system puts restrictions on the ability of politicians to manipulate the 
bureaucracy for their own interests. In a world without political uncertainty such an 
autonomous bureaucratic structure would contradict with the optimization behavior of 
politicians. But in the presence of uncertainty the incumbent may not be sure about his 
administration in the future'^’. Today's' opposition may take the power tomorrow. If the 
incumbent is capable of manipulating the bureaucracy, so is the opponent. Therefore to 
prevent nullification of his policies, the incumbent should restrict his power of opportunism.
It is possible to observe some of these restrictions in various aspect of personal 
management. Examinations prevent the selection of candidates in accordance with subjective 
and personal criteria. Officials have a significant job security which is further reinforced by 
the judiciary review, usually an independent regulatory agency. Politicians cannot dismiss the 
agent by using partisan preferences. Promotion of the officials is also subject to some 
impersonal criteria which implies performance, tenure, education, etc..
The other characteristics of the merit system is that it helps the selection of the most 
(or more) able candidates in the recruitment examinations and promotes competition between 
officials. Note that to promote an upper grade depends on the tenure; it is almost an automatic 
process which is not usually interrupted without a legal violation or a significant 
mismanagement of the official. Plowever promotion to senior positions requires an extra 
performance and quality. This feature of the merit system makes officials build a reputation 
and show a good performance. Adverse selection problem is partially solved by entrance 
examinations, and the moral hazard problem by the competition between officials. In both 
cases the monitoring and information cost of the principal will be significantly reduced. 
Because it is candidates who should show their characteristics and prove their quality in order 
to enter to public service, principal need not devote so many resources to understand the type 
of the candidate. Examinations may provide necessary selective incentives for educated and 
skilled individuals to apply to the public service on one hand and discourage uneducated 
candidates on the other hand. Similarly in order to promote to senior positions, officials 
should prove their superiority, not the principal. There will be less need for monitoring if 
agents have necessary incentives to act 'properly' to the benefit of their superiors.
Even one \week is a long long time in politics.
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There is one missing part in personnel management, if efficiency considerations has a 
dominant factor in politicians' mind. Salary system in public sector is very rigid, and the 
salary levels do not depend on the performance. Hence an official with average skill may earn 
as much as another one with good skill as long as their position is same. Similarly there is no 
salary differentiation between an official with bad performance and another with good 
performance. Note that it is the probability of promotion which is affected by the quality and 
performance; earnings is affected in an indirect way and with a less significant manner due to 
uncertainty of promotion. So, a risk-averse individual may prefer inaction rather than 
attempting to act effectively due to risk of failure which causes an embarrassment and 
threatens job security. Moreover for a senior bureaucrat there is little gain, if any, from further 
promotion. So, incentive for continuance of the position becomes dominant factor in his 
motivation. They will bias to status quo to keep their positions. Naturally due to political side 
of senior bureaucratic positions they also have to be sensitive to the interests of their political 
masters. But the above considerations create a constraint on the degree of this sensitivity.
Given the absence of performance-based salary systems and inaccuracy inherent in 
selection by standard entrance examinations, it appears that politicians are more concerned to 
reduce their — and opponents' — discretion rather than to ensure that appointees are qualified 
and showing good performance
3.7.3 Merit System - The Agent's Point of View
So far I have discussed why merit system is desired by politicians. Now consider the 
other side of the coin. Agents, or most of them, also prefer it to patronage. It is the usual trade 
off between risky-high pay off and certain-low payoff Merit system offers the opportunity of 
promotion in the long run, so the expected return is not very high. On the other hand under 
patronage system agents may capture significant gains without spending so much time and 
labour, but it is not a certain gain since pay-off is conditional on the continuance of political 
support. Hence career bureaucrats who are risk averse due to their concern on career, support 
the merit system to maintain their neutrality, to reduce the political risk and to increase their 
promotion in the long term..
This support leads to another extension: Since senior bureaucrats do not wish to risk 
their career by creating a partisan image, they will be concerned about actions of their 
agencies. They will try to manage their agencies as smoothly as possible so that only a few 
losers will be created by their policies that can accuse the agents of partisanship. They will 
fear deteriorating relationship with interest groups. Hence they will monitor their 
subordinates to keep them under control and to deter any 'hostile' actions which will cause an 
antipathetic attitude against their agencies. Therefore the hierarchical authority which 
decrease the agency cost is secured by senior bureaucrats rather than politicians.
Merit system also acts as a self-enforcement mechanism used by subordinates to 
secure the neutrality of their superiors in the bureaucratic structure. Subordinates do not want 
to risk their promotion probability in the long term. They should not only think about the 
current administration, but also consider the attitudes of future governments. By revealing 
their preferences, agents face the risk of punishment by opponent groups who may capture the
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authority in the future. So, they do not only favor neutralism, but also restrict the partisan 
behaviors of their superiors in the bureaucracy. It is particularly observed if the elections are 
imminent and/or the incumbent is likely to lose the election.
3.7.4 Employment Conditions
In this section the following features of the internal labor market will be examined: 
Salaries, promotion, dismissal, tenure, and p e n s i o n Th e  most direct way of preventing 
agency loss is a perfect monitoring and dismissal of non-compliant officials. However 
dismissal as a punishment mechanism is an empty threat in most of the cases. In general the 
job security of officials provides sufficient protection against dismissal. So, the central 
authority may decide to create selection and compliance incentives by using the employment 
conditions.
L) Salary:
Two aspects of salary system are important: First, the difference between the salary 
paid by the state and the income expected in external labor market. Second, the salary 
difference between the subordinates and the superior.
One expected result of higher expected income in private market is examined under 
the title of External Labor Market: The higher is the difference, the greater incentive for good 
performance appear among the agents. The reason is that they want to build a positive image 
and reputation by performing well in the public sector. However if this difference is too much, 
then there would be little incentive to prefer public service. Skilled individuals will be 
attracted by high salaries offered by private sector. So, only unskilled people who face an 
average pay-off in the external labor market will apply to serve in public sector. Another 
problem is that if salary of an agent is above the participation limit but well below the 
required amount for a wealthy life, then the agent may prefer to shirk to enjoy his leisure time, 
or corrupt to increase his consumption'*.
An important aspect of the salary system is the change in payoff after a promotion to 
an upper position or to an upper grade. Usually the agent promotes to an upper grade each 
year automatically and only a slight increase in salary occurs. Whereas promotion to an upper 
position depends on a competition between the officials and the salary obtained at that new 
position is well above the previous one.
ii.) Probability o f  Promotion:
Probability of promotion to a higher position is affected by the performance of the 
agent. Nevertheless some partisan considerations also account for the promotion. If the former 
is dominant, then it will create an incentive for the agents to improve their efficiency. So, 
agency loss will reduce significantly. The importance of the latter will undermine the 
efficiency considerations. Although it increases the power of central authority over
A simple model which is constructed to analyze and understand the implications of this section is present in 
Appendix.
Miller and Мое (1985).
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bureaucrats and strengthen the compliance incentives, it should be noted that the monitoring 
activity is also centralized. Now it is the principal who should prove the disobedience of an 
agent who is claimed to be loyal.
in.) Dismissal and Tenure:
Usually public officials enjoy a high job security. This a powerful restriction on the 
power of central authority to influence the decisions of officials once officials are appointed. 
Restriction of use of dismissal as a disciplinary instrument significantly reduces the political 
pressure on agents. But it also leads to the agency loss. Tenure may give officials greater 
scope to act in their own interests. In fact it has two effects on the productivity of the agent. 
On one hand it will decreases the career-opportunities. Since the senior bureaucrats will stay 
at their position for a long time, the probability for subordinates to promote to the upper step 
will decrease. On the other hand it will increase the value of the senior position, since the 
agent who succeeds to be promoted that step will have a long tenure. So the net effect of the 
long tenure is ambiguous.
iv.) Pension:
Public servants have another important incentive to prefer public service. The net 
compensation of an agent is not limited with the salary he receives. He also guarantees a 
retirement income upon the end of his public service. The amount of pension is proportional 
to the tenure of the agent. So, it creates an incentive to serve at the lower grade even when the 
salary at that level is less than compatible private sector jobs. Because pensions make 
compensation at the senior grade conditional on service at the lower grade, a high pension 
component makes senior positions less attractive to private sector candidates with high private 
sector reservation wages. This means that the pool of potential competitors for senior 
positions will be reduced. Agents will try to maximize their tenure to increase their rate of 
pension and they will become less rebellious in order not to risk their career. As a result the 
presence of pension will motivate officials for not to shirk, to be more compliant and less 
partisan.
3.7.5 Deficiencies
There are several problems associate with the merit system. One set of problems are 
related to the competitive structure of the merit system: lack of incentives for the senior 
bureaucrats, strategic behavior of the officials, intergenerational competition, and creation of 
groups of alliance within the bureaucracy. The other problem is related to the inadequacy of 
entrance examinations:
The value of a position in the hierarchy is the sum of compensation received at the 
position plus the expected value of promotion. If the compensation gap is constant between 
the steps, then the value of promotion will lose its relative importance as rank increases. If the 
individuals are risk-averse the reduction in this probability will be even much greater. Hence 
the senior bureaucrats will have less incentive to work harder. At the top position, the agent 
will only care about to preserve his place, if he as no political preferences.
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The other deficiency of the merit system is strategic behavior of the agents to 
influence the behavior and output of opponents. It should be noted that in merit system the 
competition does not take place in absolute terms, but in relative terms. So, the award 
mechanism is based on the relative quality and performance of the agents, not their real 
output. One way for an agent to increase the probability of promotion is to improve his 
performance. This is a positive incentive for productivity. Another way is to deteriorate the 
performance of the opponent and degrade his image. As third way is the collusion of the 
competitors to decrease the severity of the competition.
One can influence the behavior of the opponent in several ways. One is to scare off the 
opponent by committing to a high level of effort. Observing the overexertion of the agent, the 
opponent may decrease his effort, if it is too costly to exert same level of working. Another 
way of influencing the behavior of the opponent is to fool him about the level of effort 
committed or the quality level. If the opponent is convinced that the agent is not adequate for 
promotion, he will relax and reduce the level of effort. A third way is to sabotage the effort of 
the opponent directly. A fourth way is the cooperation among the officials to reduce the level 
of performance necessary performance. Since the public authority is committed a certain 
salary structure, then officials will be better of if they reach an agreement among themselves 
to reduce their effort. Because the payment is on the basis of relative importance, it should be 
possible for all workers to enjoy an easier life without affecting individual prospects for 
promotion. In such a case the agent who will promote will be chosen arbitrary. There are two 
types of constraint for the agents: One is that their effort level should not decrease below a 
certain amount that makes both useless for the employer. Second, they have to ensure that the 
parties will stick to the agreement. Several punishment mechanisms are present to enforce the 
agreement: Social punishment, pressure on the employer to punish the noncompliant, 
sabotage etc.
Since promotion and preservation of position depend on the competition within the 
bureaucracy, agents less likely assist their colleagues in order not to improve their 
performance. The experienced officials will be nervous about imparting knowledge to Junior 
officials who may become competitors at some future date. As the struggle among competing 
officials increases, some mutual support groups will emerge within the bureaucracy among 
non-competing officials. So, individual competition will transform into group competition 
which will increases the degree of all problems discussed so far. One way to mitigate the 
cooperation problem is to found a relation between the longevity of officials and the 
probability of tenure. This will attenuate the problem, particularly the negative effects of 
intergenerational competition by reducing the pool of candidates. However there is a trade off 
between the productivity side of the competition and the conflict of interests among the 
competing individuals. As the cooperation among the officials is encouraged, there will be 
less incentive for the agent to be more productive.
One purpose of entrance examinations is to create incentives to select 'right' kind of 
candidates. It is a two-sided selectivity. The employer select the skilled individual on one 
hand, only the skilled individual is encouraged to apply on the other hand. However 
examinations are not perfect to observe the quality of the candidates. It is not possible to
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observe all characteristics of an individual. Moreover examinations may not be adequate to 
measure the competitiveness of individuals even in selected criteria. These are deficiencies 
inherent in the nature of examinations that lead to adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Besides, the central authority may manipulate the entry requirements and entrance 
exams to attract and select a particular type of agent. For example the pool of candidates may 
be restricted by putting rules on type of candidates that are allowed to apply to the public 
service; Favoring graduates of particular schools, asking foreign language, putting upper 
and/or lower limits for age, etc. Similarly it is possible to discriminate individuals in 
examination phase by preparing exam questions in accordance with education of particular 
groups. These problems are created by the central authority for the purpose of recruiting the 
'right' kind of individuals who will serve to the interest of their employers.
3.S Creating Agency's Own Constituency
Some authors suggest that it is possible to eliminate the trade-off between legislative 
drift and bureaucratic drift using tlie organizational structure and design of administrative 
agencies and supplementary procedural rules‘‘f  "[Legislalures] do this in the initial 
hardwiring o f the agency; in defining the agency's mission and tasks so that it attracts right- 
thinking experts to its staff; and in their encouragement o f agency competition which, in turn, 
encourages the agency to do battle for the interests supported in the original enabling 
legislation"' '^ .^ So, without being restricted by the uncertainty of future, the incumbent may 
create a compliant and effective organization.
The locus of argument is that politicians can reduce agency loss not only by creating 
the structure of the bureaucracy but also determining which interest groups will have access to 
the decision making and implementation mechanisms of the agency, i.e. by determining its 
clientele. The initial hardwire of the bureaucracy provides incentives to the agency to favor 
the preferences of the interest group which is responsible from its creation. The benefits of the 
agency and the interest group are connected in the design stage, therefore both actors have 
mutual interests to keep their partners alive. The interest group needs the agency to promote 
their preferences; the agency cares about the welfare of the interest group, because their 
demand leads to emergence and expansion of the agency. If the interest group ceases to exist 
or loses its power, then the requirement for the agency will be diminished. Hence the agency 
find it of interest to watch out the continued survival of its clientele. It will empower its 
clientele and weaken others, so that dominant political preferences in the future will become 
endogenous. Legislative drift will be prevented by preserving the initial circumstances which 
makes the client dominant in the game. Even future interests are not observable, the agency 
will adjust to the changing needs of the initial groups.
However critics of this approach have doubts about the generalization of these 
arguments to the whole bureaucracy^'. First, it is not clear why the agency does not desert the
ISlVIacey (1992).
20 Shepsle (1992), p.113.
21 Shepsle (1992) and Levine (1992).
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initial group and seek other supporters. Seeond, the degree of modifieation of future 
preferences that will be dominant in the political arena is not certain. Third, the cooperation 
within the initial interest group need not exist forever. The agency may find itself facing 
contradictory calls from the old supporters. Fourth, winners and losers of any government 
action may be too ambiguous that the agency cannot identify its creators' position.
4. POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND THE BUREAUCRACY: AN 
APPLIED STUDY
The role of the bureaucracy in economic growth and development of democratic 
culture has not attracted the necessary attention it deserves so far. It is a simplified statement 
to assert that 'sound' policies promotes growth and 'right' kind of politicians or polity leads to 
democracy. Even they are necessary conditions, their presence is not sufficient. "Equally 
imporlant are self-enforcing insliludons that secure property rights, provide credible 
commitments between the government actors and private agents and among private agents, 
limit government incursions into private lives and efficiently supply public good,<i"'^ .^ 'Sound' 
policies and 'right' politicians should be supported by consent of citizens and effective 
implementation.
Emphasize on 'sound' policies have lead to development of state-oriented ideology 
which concentrates on interventionist state and planning economy. During the economic 
depression of 1930s, relative success of Soviet Unions and then some European countries, like 
Germany and Italy, augmented the popular support for the role of state in economy. It is not 
surprising to observe once again that facts create their own theories: need for interpretation of 
empirical realities lead to emergence of Keynesian economy which criticized the inability of 
private market forces to secure equilibrium at full employment. Then Solow showed that it is 
not necessary to observe the convergence of growth level across the rich and poor countries. 
There exists various equilibrium levels depending on the capital accumulation of the 
countries. Hence unless there is no intervention from outside he market, the poor is bound to 
remain so.
Then comes the 'developmental state' of Evans^ .^ The developmental state is different 
than the interventionist state in terms relations between the state and the society. Unlike the 
state-dominated information mechanisms of the previous one, it emphasizes on a mutual 
information How: First, from society to state in order to secure the internalization of the latter 
to the demands and necessities of the former. Second from state to society to achieve 
autonomy of the former from the self-seeking pressure of the latter.
In this 'third way of thinking' economic growth is not only a question of 'correct' 
policies, but capacity of state to enforce such policies. The failure of interventionist state is 
criticized as the unavoidable result of not triggering private incentive. State was unable to 
obtain accurate information from the private agents, and to respond to changes in economic
22 Campos, Levi, and Shermar (1994) p.1.
23 Evans (1992).
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conditions. So even it has a coherent and well-structured bureaucracy, it does not lead to 
economic development. Evans gives Zaire as an example of how a state may have an 
autonomy on one hand and lack it on the other hand simultaneously. The state in Zaire is not 
constrained by the society, so it has an autonomy; but also policy decisions are up for sale to 
private interest groups; so the state cannot act independently.
Developmental state model of 21th century have been seeking in South Asia. The 
countries under the spot light of researchers are South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, and 
others. All these counties have a common point: their bureaucracies. The main characteristics 
of these bureaucracies are as foliows^ "*;
• Strong meritocratic system - in both recruitment and promotion phases, long-term 
career rewards and an established bureaucratic tradition
• Elite nature of officials with strong ideological convictions
• Respected Statue of bureaucrats which attracts talented graduates
• Informal networks within the bureaucracy, close personal and organizational ties 
between the officials
• Privileged position of a particular agency: Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
in Japan, Economic Planning Board in South Korea, Industrial Development Bureau 
and the Council on Economic Planning and Development in Taiwan
• Formal external Networks between state and private sector which serve as extra- 
bureaucratic organizations
• Employment of retired senior bureaucrats in industry associations, quasi governmental 
organizations and individual corporations which strengthen the relationship between 
the bureaucracy and the private market
The first five features provide an internal coherence and cooperation within the 
bureaucracy which leads to an autonomous organization resisting to the particularistic demand 
of pressure groups. Whereas the last two features lead to necessary adaptation of the state to 
the private sector to ensure substantive information flow, incentives to officials to promote 
social welfare, and cooperation with private sector effective implementation of policies25. 
Institutional channels for continual negotiation of goals and policies provide a significant 
flexibility to the state policies which enables 'change in course' when the conditions make it 
necessary. Without autonomy, adaptation may degenerate into an economic structure 
protected from changes in status-quo. Whereas without adaptation officials may have neither 
incentive nor capability to provide economic growth.
One should pay attention to the difference in degree of state intervention observed in 
those countries. Japan limited itself to strategically selected economic sectors and 
concentrated on growth in these sectors. State in Taiwan has a greater control over the 
economy and intervenes more directly to support and enforce the emergence of a free market. 
There were very large state-owned sectors which dominated the economy. State provided an 
assured market to minimize the entrepreneur risk. Then gradually shifting incentives to
24 Evans (1992).
25 Haggard and Kaufman (1992).
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export, it reduced the protection over time. Autonomy of state prevented the creation rents to 
the interest groups.
Unlike Asian developmental states, Brazil and India fail to promote such an 
achievement. For Brazil, it is the lack of coherent bureaucratic structure which reduces the 
ability of the state to resist social pressure. Higher degree of patronage prevents the creation 
of a stable bureaucratic structure, provokes strategies for individual and political gains, and as 
a result it makes the bureaucracy vulnerable to the influence of rural oligarchy. In India, in 
spite of the existence of a solid tradition in the bureaucracy, the state lacks the virtue of 
selectivity for intervention. There exists lesser capacity of state to satisfy massive demand of 
society. The cultural difference between anglophile elite bureaucrats and the society prevents 
the emergence of a shared objective, ideology and cooperation between them.
The empirical study of Campos, et.al. show a direct relation between a competitive 
bureaucracy and the economic performance. Authors have examined bureaucracies in various 
countries depending on 6 criteria; efiiciency of state intervention, effectiveness of subsidies, 
incentives to private sector, transparent government, influence of pressure groups, deterrence 
of improper practices of the bureaucrats. Based on survey results they ranked the countries 
and compared their economic performance. Survey results, data for private investment rates of 
counties are displayed in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2: Relationship Between The Bureaucracy and Economic Performance
Countries
Overall Score Based on 
(Negative) Value of The 
Bureaucracy
Average Private Investment 
Rate (%) (1981-1989)
South Korea 36 24.17
India 68 9.37
Brazil 81 11.97
Taiwan 26 12.2
Singapore 9 29.67
Hong Kong 20 19.17
Thailand 40 17.03
Pakistan 57 6.42
Indonesia 60 15.47
Malaysia 17 15.82
Mexico 40 11.34
Venezuela 61 8.34
fhey emphasize on the relation between a competent bureaucracy and private 
investments (Figure 2-1):
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Figure 2-1: Private Investment Rate and Quality of Bureuacracy
The regression results show that there is a significant relationship between the 
competitiveness of the bureaucracy, and private investment rate (Table 2-3). Note that 
although a competent bureaucracy is not able to explain high private investments completely 
(Figure 2-2), its effect is not negligible.
Table 2-3: OLS Estimates of The Bureaucracy
degrees of 
freedom: 11
OLS
Estimate
(t-statistics)
OLS
Estimate^ 
(t statistics)
Dependent
Variable
Investment Investment
Constant 23.637671** 25.177372**
(6.9638) (7.2394)
Bureaucracy -0.199383* -0.221229*
(-2.8220) (-3.1527)
R-SQ. (ADJ.): 0.387652 0.47201
F-Ratio: 7.96364* 9.93974*
** 0.01 significance level 
Omitting Taiwan
* 0.05 significance level
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Figure 2-2: Residuals vs Investment Rate
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How does a well-structured bureaucracy enable economic growth? "...the instilutional 
design o f the bureaucracy and behavior o f its agents act as signaling mechanisms to actors in 
the private market"^^. A competent and impartial bureaucracy assures the citizens that i.) 
benefits of compliance will be distributed fairly, ii.) the non-compliant is not allowed to 
exploit the compliant, and iii.) if the benefits of compliant incurs in the long run, it will not be 
withheld. Hence citizens are convinced that a cooperative behavior is for their own interest, at 
least in the long run. Citizens believe in the signals of the bureaucracy, because of the 
structure of the bureaucracy which creates necessary incentives to the officials to make 
credible commitments about the implementation of promised policies and the safeguarding of 
property rights. These incentives are created by benefits of personal reputation, salary 
mechanisms, meritocratic and competitive promotion and recruitment of agents, effective 
monitoring of actions within the agency, and punishment of non-compliant behavior of the 
agent. Where bureaucrats are incompetent or corrupt, compliance is seldom a maximizing 
strategy for agents in the private economy, since bribery and illegal activity will tend to yield 
higher rewards.
Citizen consent decreases the government's transaction cost of monitoring the citizens 
and the enforcement cost of implementing the policies. Also it decreases the cost of 
governance, since public opinion is more tolerant to government experimentation and 
occasional mistakes. As the expectations of rewards from cooperation and rule-adherence 
increase, most of the cooperation and commitment problems are solved within the society and 
between the society and the state. Note that noncompliance results in misallocation and waste
Campos, Levi, and Shermar (1994) p.4.
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of resources, because uncooperative behavior is, in most cases, not optimal for the society and 
the enforcement is costly. Moreover it may lead to creation of informal markets which 
substitutes ineffective and legal misconduct formal markets. Hence a competent, impartial and 
credible bureaucracy may promote both economic development and democratic culture.
5. CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have examined the role of the bureaucracy in political arena. Unlike 
the first chapter I did not assume that state is an apparatus in the hands of politicians. It may 
act as an independent player and its actions significantly change the behavior of politicians 
and electorates. First considering different types of polity, I have classified various 
bureaucracy types to understand its behavior and motivation as a function of the environment 
in which it is operating. Since structure of the bureaucracy is affected by the influence of 
social and political factors, I prefer to create a link between various bureaucratic types and 
different polities. After classification of bureaucratic types, I have analyzed the behavior and 
motivation of agents. Two features of the bureaucracy, political involvement and bureaucratic 
distinctiveness, have been examined in this study. The first one represents the participation of 
officials to the decision making process, whereas the second one implies their preferences. 
This classification helps the understanding of bureaucratic behavior as a function of social and 
political variables.
Participation of the bureaucracy to the political scene as a separate actor creates certain 
problems in their relationship with politicians. From the politicians' point of view, it is a 
straightforward principal-agent problem: elected officials who create administrative agencies 
must worry about future shirking by bureaucrats. Politicians lack the necessary expertise to do 
the job on their own, they do not have enough information about the characteristics and 
motivation of the agent, and they are unable to observe and judge their actions. For officials' 
point of view the problem is quite different. Politicians try to manipulate their ranks with 
partisan considerations, act in an irrational way contrary to the professional concerns, and 
threaten their relations with the future governments. However there exists one additional 
problem for politicians which is peculiar to public sector: Legislative Drift. The incumbent 
has to deal with not only the bureaucracy but also opponents who may capture the office in 
the future. By embedding disputes within politics in this analysis, I have attempted to 
construct 'a general equilibrium model', rather than 'a partial equilibrium model'.
Then I have examined available mechanisms to control the bureaucracy, the 
application of these mechanisms and their drawbacks. These mechanisms have different 
features, but the crucial difference is about the way they operate. Some of them concentrate 
on the creation of certain incentives to encourage 'good' behavior of the agent. Hence they try 
to correct bureaucratic drift within the system, without any intervention from outside. Setting 
employment conditions is the best example of such behavior. Instead of dealing with each 
agent and agency one by one, the incumbent may prefer to determine the structure of internal 
labor market. Mechanisms embedded in employment conditions provide necessary incentives 
for a compliant behavior. Delegation of authority also serves the same purpose by creating a 
commitment mechanisms for the agent to the policies of government. Moreover leaving the
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agency alone with the society may also force bureaucrats to act according to the interests of 
politicians In all cases it is left to the agent whether to obey or not to obey these incentives. 
External labor market is completely out of control, but the incumbent should consider the 
incentives provided by private market while deciding on the employment conditions.
On the other hand some controlling mechanisms emphasize on direct intervention of 
politicians to create a compliant agent through appointment system, or direction or restriction 
of action space of the agent. These measures do not care about construction of certain 
incentives and do not rely on the voluntary participation of the agent. Cooperation and 
compliance of the agent is enforced by politicians in a direct manner.
Other mechanisms aim to mitigate the information problems. Remember that one of 
the reasons of principal's problem is lack of information about the agent. These measures try 
of solve this problem by providing necessary information to the incumbent. Actions of agents 
are observed either by politicians directly or by the society.
All these measures have certain defects. Some these deficiencies are inherent in their 
structure. For example high salary may cause a compliant behavior as well as a non-compliant 
one. It reduces the need for shirk on one hand, decreases the incentive for productivity on the 
other hand. But the crucial factor which affects their operation negatively is the existence of 
problems within the political system. Concern for legislative drift overshadows the scope of 
principal's problems and prevent the construction of necessary mechanisms to control he 
agency.
In the last part I have studied the bureaucracy in action in a comparative base, 
referring to various experiences of particular countries. At the end of this empirical study, is 
shown that a 'good' bureaucracy may solve many problems I have examined in the first 
chapter. A competent and impartial bureaucracy assures the citizens that a cooperative 
behavior is for their own interest, at least in the long run. Citizens believe in the signals of the 
bureaucracy, because of the structure of the bureaucracy which creates necessary incentives to 
the officials to make credible commitments about the implementation of promised policies 
and the safeguarding of property rights. As the expectations of rewards from cooperation and 
rule-adherence increase, most of the cooperation and commitment problems are solved within 
the society and between the society and the state.
CHAPTER THREE
POLITICS, SOCIETY AND THE 
BUREAUCRACY:
THE TURKISH CASE'
In the previous chapters I have explored and analyzed the general context to 
understand the relationship among the political actors, citizens, and the bureaucracy. In this 
chapter I will concentrate on the Turkish case using the framework constructed in the previous 
chapters. First, the historical evolution of Turkish bureaucracy and politics will be examined 
in a chronological order to get familiar to its peculiar features. I will adapt our framework to 
the Turkish case to grasp the problems observed in the relationship of basic actors, their 
reasons, and application of solution techniques to mitigate these problems. In the last part I 
present some empirical data, processed according to the implications of the first two parts.
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The primary target of this part is to understand the pattern of evolution observed in 
Turkish bureaucracy and politics from the last decades of Ottoman Empire to the late 1980s. I 
will divide this period into several stages for convenience of our study. These classifications 
will depend on the distinguishing aspects of each stage, though it is possible to further 
separate each stage into sub-stages. Nevertheless although our classification is not arbitrary, it 
is possible to reach different stages using different criteria without affecting the implications 
of this study.
/. 1 The inheritage o f Ottoman Empire
Ottoman Empire is supposed to have a patrimonialistic nature^ where the central 
authority is not checked by the countervailing powers^. However this structure does not share 
all the characteristics of a personalist rule and that decreases the degree of patrimonialism. 
The main reason of this ambiguity was that the state norms were impersonal to a large extent 
and the rulers themselves were expected to conform these norms. So, it is not reasonable to 
claim that rulers in Ottoman Empire did not face any restriction, whatsoever, in their actions.
' For economic data used in this chapter for Turkey , see Pakdemirli (1991) and Türkiye İstatistik Yilligi 
(1994).
2 Heper (1987a).
3 Heper (1989).
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Nevertheless these restrictions did not come from the groups within the periphery. The 
Ottoman center enjoyed a high autonomy from the ordinary people, at least until the last a few 
decades. Main reason of absence of society in policy making process was the lack of 
information channels between the state and the society. Ottoman state always felt 
uncomfortable about the strength of interest groups. She never allowed emergence of a 
powerful group, neither industrial and agricultural, nor commercial. Local notables appeared 
in different constitutes of the country were not able to sound their voices, as long as the 
reason of their existence was the continual support of the state.
Hence there was no organized, coherent groups within the society which could affect 
the policies of government by exerting pressure on the rulers. Altough Mardin  ^points out the 
role of popular-local religion acting as a mechanism which links the lower classes to the ruler, 
it was nothing but a one-way flow of obedience and legitimacy. For hundreds years religion 
and religious establishment provided the legitimacy — the ideological basis — to the behavior 
of the ruler, and acted as a social control mechanism. Religious establishments restricted the 
interference of the state to the daily file of the ruled by providing services of a modern state, 
such as cultural services, education, social assistance and security, local administration, and 
Judiciary. But also they prevented the interaction and communication between the ruled and 
the ruler that could have been observed in a state which provides these services. Moreover as 
long as the 'popular religion' was under the control of the 'official religion', these 
establishments also acted as a social control mechanisms of the community by reinforcing and 
identifying roles of ordinary people.
But if the ruler is not restricted by the ruled, then what put limits on its action space? 
d’here were only two factors that attracted the attention of the rulers: one was the competition 
of the elite groups for authority and power; the other one was the pressure of foreign 
countries. Since our framework is 'closed', I do not pay attention to the latter. The presence of 
the former was, in most cases, sufficient to restrain the ruler and to force him to obey 
particular state norms.
Main actors of inter-elite competition were the army {Yeniçeri Ocagi), the religious 
authorities {ulemâ), the state elites {sadrâzam, vezir, bab-i âli) and the emperor {pâdişâh). 
The power of first one based on the strength of military force, the second one on religion, the 
third one on expertise in administration, and the fourth one on the respect of the society due to 
association of the throne with the existence of country. All exerted their dominance on each 
other in certain time periods, either by their own power or by forming a coalition with other 
groups. Since each period usually ended with the disappearance of leading representatives of 
the losers, it is possible to identify these periods by observing the ends of leading actorsL
This competition between the major groups lead to reinforcement of state norms, if not 
to their emergence. They were similar to self-enforcing cooperative agreements which 
restricted the action space of the actors. Since violation of these norms provoked the response
 ^Serif Mardin (1971).
5 Such a study is not within the boundary of this study however.
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of the compliant, they continued to survive unless one group became confident of its ability to 
defeat others.
Hence a state agent should not only care about the wills of the dominant ruling groupé’, 
but also state norms. The first factor causes the emergence of patrimonial features in the 
administration, whereas the latter lead to legal-rational ones. The Ottoman bureaucracy is 
described until the 19th century as a structure that lacks an institutionalized form around fixed 
norms. It had personalist features which require the absolute loyalty of the subordinate to the 
superior. Although state norms forces the agent to be adherent to the formal rules from time to 
time, the nature of inter-elite competition determines whether it is essential to be loyal to the 
ruler or to the formal rules. However the Ottoman bureaucracy never became sensitive to the 
demand of the society, owing to its two additional features: The recruitment system which 
eliminates ties between the officials and the social groups, and the education system 
designated by the state in order to induce the emergence of a separate administrative class 
distinguished by the society.
Modernization movement of the 19th century lead to a substantial change in the 
administration and gradually in the political life. Tanzimat Period that lasted until the end of 
the third quarter of the century was the first phase of a significant shift towards a legal- 
rational bureaucracy. First, knowledge of diplomatic correspondence and foreign languages 
induced the importance of expertise and merit based appointments. But when the leaders of 
Tanzimat began to emphasize foreign social grace, rather than knowledge, a clash between 
bureaucratic rationality and new state norms came into existence. Second phase of 
modernization movement initiated by Young Turks, and Union and Progress Society (Ittihak 
ve Terakki Cemiyeti) further promoted the role professionalism in administrative tasks.
As a result, the legal and rational sides of the bureaucracy came into sight gradually. 
Personnel management turned out to be handled more professionally: education of the 
recruitment became modernized, job security in the public service was sustained, salaries of 
the officials was stabilized, relations within the agencies became more formal and impersonal. 
New code of laws were either adapted from the European countries or prepared by the state 
elites; whatever their source they lead to an administration adherent to these laws and 
regulations. Need for social and economic developments initiated the entrance of the state into 
public works. Naturally public investments to build an infrastructure and a manufacturing 
industry provoked a new generation of officials whose primary concern were the principles of 
positive sciences, expertise, and technical knowledge.
However personalist features of the Ottoman bureaucracy continued their significance: 
although many institutions were imported from the Europe, most of them were not managed 
to be cultivated in a place not much familiar with their origin. Institutionalization of the 
bureaucracy could not be achieved simply by adapting foreign institutions and code of laws. 
Loyalty of the officials was still credited prior to knowledge and expertise. Destruction of 
traditional state norms relieved state elites from the necessity of obeying these restrictions.
Due to special importance of pâdişâh, a prudent agent should also consider his wills however inadequate he 
seems to be.
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So, inter-elite conflict amplified steadily. Legal regulations served, to a great extent, to the 
creation of an agency acting as an instrument of the leading groups commanding the Ottoman 
state. Higher positions in the bureaucracy were captured by the elite groups who regarded 
these positions for political purposes, rather than administrative concerns. Bureaucracy 
remained to be isolated from the society. Although new schools and universities provided a 
channel for the lower class to enter public service, they also constructed another formidable 
wall between the center and the periphery. Emergence of a new educated generation 
distinguished itself from the uneducated majority.
Hence modernization movements of 19th century did not lead to creation of a 
Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy, but rather a 'legal-patrimonial' one. This new 
bureaucracy complied to the legal regulations that were arranged by the dominant political 
groups whose primary purpose was to make the bureaucracy serve to their interests.
1.2 Republican Period: The Initial Stage 1920-50
Inheritage of Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey was a polity dominated by 
the center. Policies of the republican government continued to be determined by the state 
elites who insulated themselves from the periphery. The only exchange occurred within the 
country was between the state and local notables which resembled so much to their Ottoman 
roots. Many of them had been created in the last years of the Ottoman state when the 
nationalist government directly took part in the economic development through industrial, 
commercial, and agricultural investments. State in the republican period remained to be 
skeptical to the private interest groups within the society, even to those created by itself:
"...the Kemalists, with their eyes averted to the dangers o f reactionary religion, failed 
to perceive adequately and alloM> for the burgeoning power o f professional, 
commercial, and local interests."’
Civil society was a sphere of egoism. Representatives of the society were accused of 
divisiveness. Being sensitive to the national unity and consensus, the state elites regarded 
themselves as the sole formulator and guardian of the long term national interests. Besides, 
the cultural and social development of the community was accepted as the primary objective 
of the government. Republican governments spent a great effort to change the ideas, values, 
and norms of the ancient regime and to create an ideal society of the future based on a new 
ideology.
"Energy spent on elaborating national consciousness and historical myths, instead of 
creating an economic basis for the republic.
Hence throughout this initial stage, the state prevented the emergence of a powerful 
private sector. Many of the traditional habits continued in this stage: inter-elite competition to
’’  Frey (1965) p.393.
» Mardin (1971) p.209.
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capture the public authority, autonomy of the government from the demand and monitoring of 
the society, and sensitivity of the state to the dominant interest groups within the government.
Despite the dominance of state elite, the bureaucracy remained to be powerless in the 
first decade of the republican period as it was in Ottoman empire. Distrust of leading military 
and political figures to the attitude and motivation of the Ottoman officials was preserved 
after the declaration of republic. In spite of radical changes in senior positions, middle and 
low grades of Ottoman administration survived to a great extent. Instead of building a central 
authority on the basis of a strong bureaucracy, the Republican People Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi) possessed the central role in the state. Bureaucracy acted as subordinate to the party 
and represented its administrative instrument.
As time goes by the bureaucratic elite gradually received the power of execution and 
policy making. They begun to coexist with the party and use the public authority side by side 
with the political elite. It was an integration of the state with its founder. Kemalism was 
accepted as a political manifesto which carried strong programmatic elements. Degree of 
centralization increased in 1930s both in the economic and social life. The new generations in 
the bureaucracy which was created to be used for nation building and consolidation of reforms 
emerged as an absolute elite class who considered itself as the origin of the state.
Structure of the bureaucracy remained to be a combination of personalist and legal- 
rational features. Change was on the concentration of the mixture. Development of a new 
code of laws and regulations which had been begun in the 19th century completed in the first 
decade of the republic. During the foundation of new institutions and restoration of the old 
ones the state elites were sensitive to the adherence to formal rules. This sensitivity was also 
necessary to keep old bureaucrats under control. Improvements in the personal management 
and dominance of the state in the society highly promoted the image and attractiveness of the 
bureaucracy in the public opinion. Unlike the Ottoman empire the recruitment and education 
system of the public service was more open to the community than before. Altough loyalty to 
the state elites was essential, inter-elite competition turned out to be a low level struggle 
which decreased the marginal benefit of loyalty to the ruler. Hence performance and quality 
became as important as faithfulness of the agent, if not more important. As the state 
penetrated into the economic life more and more, need for rational and productive agents 
increased continuously. Graduates of recently founded modern schools faced an over demand 
which raised their supply prices. Moreover participation of the state to the economic life also 
amplified transactions and communications with the private sector which created an 
information channel between them. Although the bureaucracy remained to be suspicious to 
the popular demand, they became, at least, aware of its existence which, in turn, affected the 
actions of the state inevitably.
However one should also aware of the presence of personalist features of the 
bureaucracy in this period. Interest groups within the economy were never able to exert a high 
pressure on the state. So, modification of the state apparatus to make it serve to the needs of 
the society was a very slow and incomplete process. Dominant figures among the state elites 
always had the necessary power to accomplish their wills. Formal rules were not sufficient to
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restrict their action space, since in most cases it was possible to circumvent those rules. 
Altough entry examinations were open to everyone who had necessary qualifications, there 
was a bias towards the graduates of the Faculty of Political Sciences (Siyasal Bilgiler 
Fakültesi - Mülkiye) due to continuing dominance of officials in top levels who graduated 
from this university. Special treatment to certain groups inside the bureaucracy created an 
elite structure. Despite the importance of performance and knowledge in low and medium 
positions, loyalty to the superior was essential for senior jobs due to their political side. Even 
at the lower levels it was not possible to apply a merit based system completely; patronage, 
social factors, associations might overrule the performance in most cases.
Bureaucracy in this period conserved its previous characteristics to a certain extent. It 
remained to be a combination of personalist and legal-rational features. However the latter 
one became more important with respect to the former. Moreover concern for productivity 
and efficiency also developed in this period.
1.3 First Experience o f Democracy: 1950s
Transition to democratic regime may be regarded as a fundamental political change 
under normal circumstances. However in Turkey it was not as radical as it should be due to 
peculiar characteristics of the politics. First of all this change was initiated by the leaders of 
the single party government. Second, most leaders of the opponent parties were members of 
the Republican People Party before the transition to democracy. Third, the new ruling class 
had no willing to lead a radical change in the political system at all.
Although the initial effects of democracy was at its minimum, even this minimal effect 
caused significant changes in political and administrative structures. Since election became 
the primary concern of politicians, political system turned out to be more sensitive to the 
demand of society. Interest groups found the opportunity of formation and address their own 
desires from the state. Need for support of interest groups caused the development of party 
programs which determined the identity of the parties. Instead of appealing to the society as a 
whole — as it is the case before transition to the democracy — parties preferred to be more 
selective to increase their value in the public opinion. Acting as a representative of a particular 
group carries the cost of losing the support of others, but being vague has the risk of losing 
all. Flence the political system begun to reflect the interests and wills of the society, at least 
partially.
The political incumbent of 1950s was anxious about the danger of losing the electoral 
support. It was a major criterion in formulation and execution of state policies. Therefore he 
was inclined to work with a bureaucracy which would act as an instrument of its political 
superiors, rather than of its own. However the political figures of Democratic Party 
(Demokrat Parti) who were in power during this period were against a radical reform in public 
service, like abolishing old generation in the bureaucracy and creating its own which would 
be more compliant than the previous one. Instead they assumed that the bureaucracy would 
act in this way automatically whatever their political preferences were: A sign of both their 
exaggerated belief in democracy and regarding themselves as a part of ruling generation of the
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republic. They failed to develop a counter set of norms and imposed it upon the civil and 
military bureaucracy.
However the old ruling state elites did not share the policies and interests of the new 
political elites. First, they did not consider the society as a set of mature people eligible for 
democratic regime. Similar to 1930s and 40s they regarded themselves as the sole formulator 
and guardian of the long term national interests. Public interest was not equivalent to the 
interests of the majority. They did not believe that public interest could be shaped in a 
democratic regime which enables competition between different groups. So, in 1950s when 
they faced the demand of the society which were addressed by the political elites, they 
resented it. When their political masters attempted to use the state apparatus to achieve these 
interests, they opposed to the politicians too. Manipulation of ranks in the bureaucracy, either 
to overcome that opposition or for partisan or productive considerations, increased the tension 
between the state elites and political elites. Though higher positions were captured by the 
political elites through political appointments, middle ranks preserved their basic features. 
Politicians presumed to command the civil and military service by controlling chief places. 
Towards the end of 1950s a hostility around the middle ranks emerged against the politicians 
and this attitude transformed into an overt uprising in 1960.
1.4 The Second Experience: 1960s
1961 coup was the attempt of traditional state elites to recapture the public authority 
from the political elites of Democrat Party. It is interesting to observe the ambivalent attitude 
of state elites towards democracy. On one hand they disliked its consequences: society was 
not developed enough to pursue the long term national interests; therefore their guardianship 
was needed for the sake of the country. Moreover politicians were self-regarding people who 
did not care about the national interests. On the other hand the state elites felt themselves 
bound to democracy: They perceived democracy as a means of securing legitimacy and 
cooperation of community for their policies. Also their associations with the western 
civilization and culture committed to follow the path of democratic countries.
1961 Constitution was prepared to reach those objectives. It was a system of check 
and balances to prevent the state from being manipulated by politicians. Legal restrictions 
were put on the supremacy of the parliament and the government. State elite formed a judicial 
concept of the state, placing greater faith in the rule of law rather than in the rule of 
parliament. It was nothing but replacement of personality of Atatürk with a set of legal 
procedures to legitimate and support the role of the state elite in multi-party regime. Moreover 
influence and intervention of the bureaucracy to the policy making and implementation 
processes were legalized to justify the role of the bureaucracy. Strong programmatic elements 
for social and economic development were put into the constitution in order to equip state 
elite with means to act, as well as means to resist. Articles of the constitution and new 
institutions found in 1960s, like State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teskilati), 
revealed the economic and social statist ideology of the bureaucracy.
A clash between the civil bureaucracy and the politicians was inevitable, especially 
after the election victory of .lustice Party (Adalet Partisi) which was the successor of
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Democrat Party. Government was prevented to exercising full authority by state elites. The 
first obstruction was in the parliament: either in Senate -  a product of 1961 constitution -  
where members of the civil and military statist groups were present, or in the House of 
Representatives where parties who shared their political preferences had a great efficacious to 
influence the acts of the parliament. The second obstruction was in the High Court (Anayasa 
Mahkemesi), which was another product of 1961 constitution. Regularly challenges to the 
constitutionality of the laws, cessation of execution, nullification of government acts were 
effectual instruments of the Court. The third barrier was the Council of State (Danistay) which 
restricted the manipulation of the civil service ranks by the politicians and reduced the 
incentives for bureaucrats to be compliant to the wills of the government. Arrangement of the 
constitution to provide enormous security and independence to judges prevented these courts 
to be disciplined by the political elites. The fourth barrier was the interest groups, primarily 
labor unions, within the society emerged in 1960s. In fact the emergence of these groups was 
a deliberate consequence of 1961 constitution which aimed to check the use of public 
authority by the government through social, political, and legal pressure of these groups.
The system of checks and balances were so effective that it resulted in diffusion of 
government power. Reaction of political elite was moderate. Justice Party did not come to a 
sharp confrontation with the officials. J'his modest attitude was a normal consequence of 
lasting effects of 1960 coup. Military factor was extremely influential throughout 1960s. Two 
failed coup attempts just a few years after the decline of Democrat Party showed that lower 
ranks in the army were still unease about the politicians. The retort of military elites against 
the attempt of a political amnesty to the ex-members of the Democrat Party indicated that 
there was a long way to go for a democratic regime. So, politicians remained calm and did not 
attempt to challenge the influence of the state elites in 1960s.
1.5 The Third Experience: 1970s
Military intervention occurred in 1971 was an adjustment of the rules of the game, 
rather than a confrontation with the political elite. The check and balance system of 60s was 
regarded as too powerful to allow an effective government. 1961 constitution had permitted 
the emergence and participation interest groups into political and economic life, but the 
government was not capable of regulating the system under the pressure of these groups. 
Unlike 1950s the conflict was not between the state and political elites. There were new actors 
within the society who were fighting with each other and the state to seize the authority and 
make it serve for their interests. Sensitivity of the military elite for national unity and 
consensus was much greater than before. Their desire for an effective, neutral and impartial 
government was observed during the transition period 1971-73 when they changed the 
constitution to decrease the 'degree of democracy' and supported an above-parties government 
in the parliament which had an agenda of social and economic reforms to mitigate hostility 
and conflicts within the society. However without the cooperation of political elite, these 
attempts was bound to fail. Failure of military candidate in 1973 presenditial election was an 
indication of return to democracy and return of political elites into the power.
The major distinguishing aspect of 70s was the multi-party politics in comparison to 
two-party politics observed in the previous decade. Contrary to the wishes of military leaders,
Politics, Society, and The Bureaucracy; The Turkish Case - 55
politics in 70s was more turbulent than before. It was a transition from a monocentrist system 
to a free polity where the ideological limits in politics set by the state elites were repudiated 
and intruded. Unlike the justice Party of 1960s, extreme parties of 70s, even central parties, 
did not avoid a confrontation with the official philosophy.
Fragmentation of politics lead to politicization. In order to keep their ranks and to 
prevent shifting of constituencies to other parties, politicians tried to increase the cost of 
defection by maximizing the ideological distance with the opponents. Moreover they 
attempted to enlarge their clientelistic networks to enlarge their influence by penetrating 
occupational and professional organizations. These attempts, in turn, increased the 
polarization of the polity even further. Despite the increasing cost of defection, inter-party 
competition also increased the reward of defection. However under fragmentation party 
discipline within the political organizations was never sustained as before.
Polarization and fragmentation of politics provoked instability within the government. 
While the former made it impossible to achieve cooperation between the parties or within the 
society, the latter one transformed the political power to small parties which has extreme 
views. Policies of governments became more radical than electorate due to incommensurate 
power of extreme parties in participating to the coalitions. Nationalist Front governments in 
late 1970s were a typical example of inter-party competition within a coalition: lack of 
agreement on critical issues, suspicion of each other, partisan view points, attempts to 
undermine others' efforts, coordination problems between the coalition partners who were 
acting independently from each other, unrestrained patronage, and impatience with the laws.
It is necessary to note the transition that occurred in the Republican People Party 
(CHP) after the election of Bülent Ecevit to the party leadership in 1972. So far CHP held been 
the root of state elites and official ideology. It had acted as a political extension of 
bureaucratic views throughout 50s and 60s against the challenge of political elites ofi first. 
Democrat Party and then .lustice Party. Under the leadership of Ecevit СИР shifted towards 
social democracy and changed its image of guardianship of traditional official ideology. It 
opposed to basic tenets of Kemalism, and rejected the concept of national state and nation. 
Instead it begun to act as a true socialist mass party making class based politics and seeking 
support of minority groups, like Kurdish and Alevi minorities. Defection of CHP into 
periphery terminated the political support of state elites. Kemalism had no longer a formal and 
organized representation in politics.
The role of military elite was reduced in 70s due to their reluctance to intervene into 
politics. Unsuccessful experiences of 1960 and 1971 interventions, failure of 1973 
presenditial elections, threat of possible cleavages within its ranks, and the weakening support 
in politics, alienation of CFIP, and intelligentsia caused an isolation of the army from the 
politics. Loss of military support further reduced the influence of state elites against political 
elite.
The major consequence of these developments was the end of significance role of the 
bureaucracy as a political group in 70s. Losing support in the military ranks, in politics, and in
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intelligentsia the bureaucracy could by no means deny the wills of politicians. Politicians 
subjugated all ranks in civil service, from higher positions to lower ones. They aimed to 
politicize the bureaucracy to create a compliant behavior which would serve to the best of 
their interests. 1970s was an example of praetorian polity in which the bureaucracy was seen 
as an instrument to be seized and used for the interests of the dominant groups. Spoils, rather 
than merit system was preferred by the incumbent. Politicians not obeying the norms and 
ethics of politics, manipulated the agencies extremely.
Politicians were not the only threat to the bureaucracy. Emergence of new groups in 
the society and rise of private sector reduced the status of official occupation. In multi-party 
democracy entrepreneurs who had been once condemned for their self-regarding interests, 
were legitimized'^ They were no longer second-class citizens, but desirable for the welfare of 
the society. So, the bureaucracy was no longer the only means of livelihood for the educated 
individuals. As the income level of officials decreased during 60s and 70s, the bureaucracy 
lost its skilled employees to the private sector and could not attract talented recruits any more 
(Figure 3-1).
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Politicians achieved to overthrow the resistance of the bureaucracy in different ways. 
First, thanks to the changes in the constitution at the beginning of 1970s which reduced the 
power of judicial reviews, they were more capable of commanding the agents through 
appointments, dismissal, replacements, and legal regulations. Second, being free from 
pressures of the 'big brother', they were able to create alternative bureaucratic structures to
Heper (1976a).
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serve their interests. Third, weakening of civil servants financially (Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3) 
and the loss of status in the society lead to opportunistic behaviors within the bureaucracy 
who aimed to acquire benefits by cooperating with the incumbent.
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Of course the long tradition of the bureaucracy did not permit a eomplete and 
unconditional surrender immediately. Although they were no longer able to show an overt 
resistance against the political elites, there were still other ways of restricting the 
implementation of government polieies. They tried to reduee the effectiveness of polieies, 
released minimum information to the incumbent, and reject the use their expertise by the 
politicians. Bureaucratic processes were used as to increase the time span of policy making, to 
make their application harder and ineffieient. As the politicians attempted to use the 
bureaucracy as an instrument for their purposes, the bureaucracy reduced the effeetiveness of 
state apparatus
1.6 The Fourth Experience: 1980s
Military coup of 1980 was a response to the problems of the last decade, such as 
polarization and fragmentation of polity, partisan groups within the bureaucracy, unstable 
coalition governments, etc. New constitution succeeding the intervention redueed the check 
and balances of the previous constitution and empowered the execution above the legislator. 
Government was equipped with neeessary power to discipline the bureaucracy. However 
judicial control of the government acts and legislation was not disassembled.
In 1980s the military elites has replaced the civil bureaucracy and became the sole 
guardian of the state and national interests. But the army was more modest and selective in its 
intervention into civil life. Kemalisin was no longer regarded as a political manifesto and 
official ideology of the state. The Turkish army has concentrated itself to the defense of 
national unity against internal and external threats, and preservation of laicism. Funetional 
framework, policy making in economic issues have been completely left to the political elites. 
In 1980s and later there is no official view in economic policies. It is a division of labor 
between the military elites and political elites. While internal and external seeurity are 
provided by the army, political and economic issues are left to politicians. So, the politicians 
acquire a free hand in their administration and face no constraint from the state elites.
Centralization of authority was proposed in order to prevent governance problems of 
70s, to circumvent pathological bureaucratization, and to prevent stalemate in parliament. To 
aehieve this goal most of the government authority was augmented in the prime ministry. 
Some important agencies are put under the prime minister, like Undersecretariat of Treasury 
and Foreign Trade. Government was released from the budgetary restrictions of the 
parliament by enabling funds outside the budget. Emphasis is put on government authority 
against legislative unruliness in dealing with economic problems by enabling government 
decrees. Decentralization of particular decisions causes delegation of some authority to local 
administrations. Political elites in office tend to be more selective than before. Hence while 
they reduce their authority in particular issues, they empower themselves by centralizing the 
authority in others.
To prevent fragmentation election system was changed to give advantage to central 
parties over the minor ones. Disciplinary power of political parties was fortified by 
eliminating the party changes of deputies. Limit on service length of party leaders was 
imposed to enable change in party leaderships and to eliminate party lords. Like the military
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intervention of 1971, ' degree of democracy' in the new constitution was further reduced to 
prevent politicization of society. Governments grasp a great power to dictate his wishes 
without any need for bargaining and consultation with the interest groups. So the incumbent 
finds opportunity to function without any constraint exerted by the social groups, primarily 
labor unions.
Military coup of 1980 also condemned reactionary and ideological features of the 
bureaucracy and empowered the government to streamline the civil service for effectiveness 
and efficiency. Throughout 1980s the political power of the bureaucracy has been diminished. 
Political elites tried to turn the bureaucracy into a subordinate arm of government, not into a 
legal-rational bureaucracy. Being equipped with disciplinary powers the political elites are 
able to create incentives for compliant behavior. The structure of the bureaucracy is designed 
to achieve an effective organization. Delegation of local responsibilities to municipalities and 
accumulation of authority within prime minister decrease the power of bureaucrats of the 
classic ministries. Job security of agents has been reduced by using temporary contracts for 
certain positions in the bureaucracy. Political appointments to the senior positions further 
enable the cooperation of the bureaucracy. As a result a new type of administrative elite has 
appeared in the bureaucracy which has both professional concerns and political views similar 
to those of political elite. However weakening of traditional bureaucratic culture does not lead 
to a complete disappearance and this causes a friction within these different types of 
governing elite within the bureaucracy.
Political system built by the military coup did not last for a long time. Political 
fragmentation of 70s reappeared after the end of political ban of old politicians and 
suspension of political competition. Beginning from 1991 elections a new set of coalition 
governments have come into existence. As central parties lose their power, both the political 
influence and electoral support of the extreme right parties increase. Distributional conflicts 
within the society which was controlled by prohibitions on the formation and operation of 
interest groups reappeared in late 80s as the democratic regime in the country is resettled. 
Economic issues have become more important in Turkish politics with compare to the cultural 
cleavages. Hence distributional conflicts and economic agenda of public opinion trigger each 
other.
2, TURKISH SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND THE 
BUREAUCRACY: ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIP
In this part I will apply the framework constructed in the previous two chapters into 
Turkish environment. First the relations between the society and political parties will be 
examined. Then the third actor, the bureaucracy, will be embedded into the study and its 
relation with politics and the society will be investigated.
2. /  Society and Political Parties
Turkish society has particular features which distinguish itself with the standard 
models of the general context. These features not only change the reason of problems 
observed within the polity and the politics, but also the scope and nature of problems as well.
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I will first describe these features and then explain the different aspects of problems and their 
reasons.
2.1.1 Turkish Polity: Basic Characteristics
Turkish polity has three important characteristics: First, the collectivist understanding 
of identity; second, direct relation with the state; and third, cultural cleavages over economic 
issues.
According to Mardin"’ it is not possible to understand the meaning of democracy in 
Turkish polity using the individualistic framework of the western culture. Individualism is a 
concept that has been introduced from Europe at the very beginning of modernization 
movements of 19th century. One of the objectives of people who initiated Tanzimat process 
and Young Turks who proceeded this process during the last a few decades of Ottoman 
Empire was to create the understanding of 'citizenship' among the Ottoman society. The 
reason evt the initial stage was to restrict the sovereignty of padişah and to found a regime 
similar to those in European countries. Then Union and Progress Party continued this 
movement to justify their administration and to create a nationalist mood within the society 
that would give birth to a Turkish state. In Republican period sovereignty based on a dynastic 
structure was replaced by a sovereignty based on a national conception. The civilization of 
western countries was accepted as an ideal model by the state elites who aimed to establish a 
similar type of society in Turkey. Flowever a state-oriented politics was presumed to be 
necessary as a transient period which would lead emergence of the necessary capacity in the 
society to create a consensus upon certain fundamentals".
However the effect of eastern side of the Turkish culture has remained to be dominant, 
at least until recently. Rather than being sensitive to the preservation of individual rights, 
collective understanding of freedom has attracted more attention and concern within the 
society. The welfare of the whole society was ahead of the welfare of individuals. Promoting 
the general interest is a virtue, and regarding one's own interest is a vice. Emphasis has been 
put on the benefit of family, or local community, or the society, rather than the individual 
optimization.
Despite the collectivist side of the people, relations with the state has been individual- 
based for a long time. There was a direct relation between the state and each of its subject. 
State has been seen as responsible for the welfare of each of its citizens. For many people the 
solution to their problem was the government. It should act to improve living conditions of 
the citizens. It should provide employment, it should keep consumer prices low, it should 
satisfy demand for satisfactory wages and high subsidies. It should take necessary measures to 
solve micro problems, as well as macro ones. It was a one-to-one relation of individuals with 
the state, not of interest groups. There was very little, if not at all, organized structure among 
the people with similar interests which are formed to exert pressure on the government to 
accomplish their goals. One reason is the inheritage of Ottoman state which has been also
Mardin (1988).
"  Heper (1987b).
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continued in the republiean period: the state has suspicion and scorn for any privilege obtain 
by powers which were not integrated with the state'2. The growth of eorporate bodies similar 
to those existed in West, such as estates of the realm, provinces, chartered cities and 
companies, independent universities, and bodies of magistrates, have been so barely allowed 
in the country. Horizontal integration within the society was always surpassed by vertical 
integration.
Although funetional demand of the society is extremely important, it has been the 
cultural cleavages which caused great turmoil in the country. Most of the uprisings of 
Ottoman Empire was initiated by eultural confliets within the society, or between the state 
and the society. It is not possible to observe a rebellion based on the demand of the workers or 
that of bourgeois. The Ottoman tradition of rebellion was centered around eultural issues, 
primarily religious. Altough economic discontent of the civilians or army prepared the 
necessary conditions a priori, economic issues almost never triggered the final uprising. In 
1980s and 90s political disputes has beeome more 'rational', when the economic issues has 
begun to posses more weight.
2.1.2 The Turkish Politics: Basic Features
It is the set of characteristies of the polity which designs the strueture of politics. So, it 
is possible to observe the extensions of these eharacteristics in the politieal arena.
Due to lack of organized interest groups and individualistic understanding of civil 
rights the Turkish politics remains to be an intra-elite eonflict. Usually the issues that ereate 
disputes between the politieal parties are not functional and directly related to the problems of 
polity, even to the economic ones. They are regarding to the cultural issues, like religious or 
nationalist, legitimacy of using public authority, individual action of party members, etc. So, 
although politicians act in the name of voters, in most cases they are not the representatives of 
popular interests and demand. Lack of participation of local and/or class groups reduces the 
disciplinary power of eleetorates and makes it very difficult to control the action of parties. 
Unlike a situation of perfect competition where free entry is possible, the system may correct 
itself as time goes on. However underparticipation of individuals in the soeiety to active 
politics grants a monopoly power to the existing parties. Moreover price mechanisms, i.e. 
elections, in politics are not frequent enough to unable transactions at false prices and to 
prevent the ereation of rent.
Politieal rent is not only present among political parties, but also within the party 
management and local party organizations. Usually extra party structures include a few 
activists who have political views more radical than the average potential voter of the party. 
This is a common problem observed in most of the representative regimes. However under the 
absence of voluntary organizations between the state and society, these local groups act the 
gatekeeper role for aeeess to central authority. Hence these groups are valued not only 
because of their right to elect party leaders and their service as information mechanisms
'^Mardin (1988).
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between the polity and the party, but also their power to voice the demand of citizens to the 
elected officials.
Party leaders try to possess monopoly power on party leadership by manipulating the 
local party organizations and helping their allies to become party delegate. Again, this is a 
natural motivation of politicians. There are two potential restriction on their power to affect 
the party organizations. One is the autonomous structure of parties which is robust to the 
pressure coming from above. However the influence of this restriction is limited with the 
tradition of democracies and political parties. The other one is the restrictions on power of 
party leaders to exert pressure. The price, i.e. power, of party leaders depends on the potential 
benefit they can provide to the customer, i.e. local politicians, and the potential disutility they 
can cause. In I'urkey party leaders possess enough power to prevent intra-party democracy 
and to create a clientelistic network in their parties. First of all they have a great discretionary 
power over state resources, both in government and in opposition'^. Second, they have the 
power to make non-compliant party members deprived of using the rent opportunity of being 
in party organization. So, it is extremely difficult change party leaders in Turkey. Political 
system lacks necessary mechanisms for releasing existing leadership to adjust to changes in 
the society.
Note that the relation between the party leaders and party members resembles the 
relation between the state elites and local notables in Ottoman Empire, especially in its last 
decades. First some particular privileges are given to the subjects to differentiate them from 
the rest of the society. Then based on the continuance support of these people, the person in 
office pursues his administration and defeats his rivals. Since state is the only available source 
of possessing rent revenue, the privileged people feel themselves bound this relation.
Since cultural cleavages are more important than functional ones, political 
compromise is very costly in Turkish politics. As far as economic issues are considered it is 
possible to find a mid-point between the conflicting interests, since it is usually possible to 
quantify the loss and benefits of agreements. However conflicts over cultural issues are more 
difficult to be solved, because in that case it is simply a matter of principle. There is not so 
much difference between being a one inch apart from the ideal point and being a one feet 
apart. It is a win-or-lose game where sharing of cost and benefit is almost impossible. Since 
the measurement criteria is different across the parties, it is not easy to calculate the net gain 
of agreements. Thus usually a political compromise is associated with a political defeat.
2.1.3 Problems, Reasons, and Their Solution
Like many people in various countries there is a cooperation problem within the 
society where each individual trying to maximize his own utility fails to come together and 
promotes the general welfare. Hence conflicting interests is the origin of these problems, 
though there may exist other factors which mitigate or amplify their scope.
Of course opposition has a certain discount value, thus the power of the opposition leader is less than that of 
the incumbent. However today's opposition is future's government. So, their value never vanishes to zero.
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Collectivist side of the people, which is discussed above, is the primary reason of 
relatively softness of competition inside the Turkish society, especially in economic issues. 
Moreover fragmentation and polarization within the society is very low. There are very few 
organizations, primarily class-based groups, that are formed by people sharing a common 
interest. Relations with the state is one-by-one, rather than through organized interest groups. 
Lack of a severe competition between the organized groups and presence of a significant 
sympathy to other-regarding behavior mitigate the scope of competition. Individuals do not 
desire to get benefit by exploiting the endowment of others. Labor do not care about profits or 
subsidies. Peasants do not object a rise in wages. Traders do not concern on agricultural 
prices. All act independently without considering the actions of other groups on their pay-off, 
or vice versa. Hence in most cases the problem within the society is not lack of cooperation, 
but rather lack of coordination.
One reason of this coordination problem is lack of information mechanisms in the 
society. Due to very weak horizontal integration, individuals fail to be informed about the 
intentions and objectives of other groups. Moreover since they do not form an organization to 
serve for their interest, they are not able to have information about the ultimate effects of 
these actions in their welfare. Even some groups are aware of the externalities, they cannot 
initiate a general discontent among the interested people to exert a counter pressure, due to 
ineffectiveness of interest groups. For example capital-owners and entrepreneurs in the private 
sector do not have an influential and effective power, owing to intra-sector competition and 
lack of a homogeneous structure within the sector·'*. They not only fail to create a well 
organized structure, but also are also unable to cooperate with each other due to lack of 
harmony between small and large firms. It is possible to observe same problems in the labor 
and agricultural sectors. Absence of voluntary organizations, other than professional 
associations and class-based groups enlarges the information problem.
Altough the degree of competition within the society is not very high, demand of 
society form the state is too great to be satisfied by the politicians, a common problem of less- 
developed countries. Remember that state is seen as responsible for the welfare of its citizens. 
So, instead of competing with each other to grasp the products of the opponent, interest 
groups prefer to compete for affecting the incumbent to make him serve for their interest. 
Since the means for redistribution is abundant in Turkish state, demand for their discretionary 
use is also high. Lack of commitment mechanisms in politics and low credibility of politicians 
prevent the restriction of competition endogenously, i.e. within the system. It is not so 
surprising that distributionary politics was at its minimum in 1980-1987 period with compare 
to succeeding years. Commitment of political actors and the citizens was achieved by 
imposing certain constraints on the demand of society which made it unneeessary for the 
ineumbent to response to the preferences of the society.
As we discussed before the key feature of public authority is that the possessors of 
public authority have the right to impose their wills on the rest of the people. In Turkey the 
state has an enormous power over to soeiety for two reasons. First, the presence of distributive
'4 Heper (1976a).
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resources and overparticipation of state into social and economic life of its citizens which can 
be used directly to the benefit of supporters. Second, the easiness of using rule making 
authority to create rents by restricting the operation of market forces.
Public resources may be used by the incumbent either for the individualistic interests 
of the party supporters, or for collective interests of the supporting groups. Unlike many 
developed countries, the remarkable role of the state in the daily life of citizens causes 
particularistic demand of individuals from the incumbent. Finding jobs in state owned 
enterprises or government institutions, credits of public banks, doing favors to individuals 
who confront to agencies for administrative affairs, subsidies and financial grants from the 
state, purchases of commodities and services by the public institutions and companies are 
some examples of one-to-one relationship of the incumbent with its eitizens. Even allocation 
of hospital beds, shifting teachers or doctors from one region to another, normal transactions 
with government agencies provoke a demand for favors on the behalf of citizens. Note that 
demand and supply of most of these matters would not cause so substantial problems, if the 
offieial agencies are effective, efficient, and well-monitored. Beeause in most cases demand 
of citizens is a well-behaving agency which should perform its service in accordance to the 
legal and justified requirements of individuals. Since the state does not perform well, citizens 
seek for favor of the incumbent even for their most natural transaetions.
Use of public resources for the collective interest of a particular district or a particular 
set of people is more general issue that is not peculiar to Turkey. Determination of wages and 
salaries of the officials and public workers, price policies of state owned enterprises, pricing 
agricultural goods, infrastructure services, public investments in particular districts can be 
specified as those resources used for that purpose. In like manner not all these requirements 
can be regarded as a favor in a well-funetioning state, though some of them are either illegal 
or not justified requirements.
Therefore supply price of the incumbent is very high due to enormous power of office 
and ineffective performance of the state. Since benefit of discretionary use of publie authority 
is high, neither legal restrictions and operation of formal institutions, nor repeated game 
strategies may be strong enough to deter its use for self-regarding purposes. Even legal 
restrietions are executed well, or institutions effectively monitor the ineumbent with 
nonempty threats, or election system punishes the 'bad' politician, the cost of misbehavior 
may not exceed its benefit. Most of these measures are effective in the long term. Formal 
rules may foree the incumbent to leave the office, formal institutions may reveal the actions, 
and electorates may punish the incumbent in the next election. But repeated game strategies 
are useful if the players do repeat the game. Benefit of even a single tenure may be enough 
high to create ineentive for a short term view.
Besides, neither of these measures are perfect. Due to dominance of the majority party 
or the coalition groups in the parliament may easily manipulate parliamentary decisions'·'’. 
Legal status quo is not stable to create formidable restrictions on the use of publie authority.
'5|Vloe(1992).
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Since it is not so difficult to make and annul laws, they cannot be relied upon for protection. It 
is a complete monopoly of the majority which gives a free hand to the incumbent to use 
public resources for its own interest. On the other hand election is not an efficient way of 
threatening the misuse of public authority. Since parliamentary elections are rarely based on a 
single issue and more frequently has a multi-dimensional feature, usually it is not feasible to 
punish the incumbent for its mismanagement. Although volatility in the bases of party support 
is high, there is almost a monopoly of the leaders over the prime ministry. Note that in 
Turkish politics it is extremely difficult to change the party leadership subsequent a defeat in 
election, even alter a series of defeats. So, there is no so much to fear for party leaders as far 
as an unusual challenge is not expected. However such a plot, especially a successful one, is 
very unusual, if not completely impossible. Note laek of intra-party democracy is one of the 
characteristics of Turkish politics. It is extremely difficult to cause a change in leadership, 
unless the leaders retire with their own wills (Turgut Özal of Motherland Party in 1989, Erdal 
İnönü of Social Democrat Populist Party in 1993, Süleyman Demirel of True Path Party in 
1993) or their physical condition no longer permits to linger (ismet İnönü of Republican 
Populist Party in 1972). For the same reason both the party members and electorates cannot 
monitor the actions of the representatives effectively. Most deputies are more sensitive to the 
demand of the party leaders, since they owe their seats to the active support of the leaders.
Although party centers have a significant power over party members, and they are able 
to modify the internal structure to increase their influence, the relationship between the party 
center and the lower ranks is by no means unilateral, i.e. from center to the periphery. The 
aetion space of the party leaders is limited to a certain extent. However the nature of this 
restriction in Turkish politics is somewhat different; party leaders need the support of lower 
ranks not to preserve their leadership, but to sustain the information channel with 
constituencies. Note that in the absence of horizontal integration within the society, party 
organizations are the most powerful and extensive network available to the politicians. They 
need this network to gather information regarding to the needs, demand, and intentions of the 
constituencies so that they can use this information to shape their own policies towards these 
regions. Moreover extra-party organizations are also needed to exert pressure on the 
electorates. These local structures act as a gatekeeper for access to Ankara. So, they are like 
supply channels which inform the customer about the price of the service and fulfill the 
payment of the incurred cost. Finally these structures are needed to mobilize electorate 
support with threats and promises, i.e. they illustrate the 'carrot' and 'stick' to the citizens.
Note that in Turkey political competition is very severe and there are very few issues 
on which the competitors reach to a consensus. Political compromise, accommodation, and 
adjustments are very rarely observed in politics, which would enable the application of Coase 
Theorem in inter-party conflicts. The incumbent usually does not care about legislative drift, 
i.e. nullification of his policies and actions by the governments in the future. There are two 
reasons of neglecting legislative drift as we have discussed above: high benefit of using 
excessive scale of public authority at the extreme, and the tenure of the incumbent that is long 
enough to exploit these benefits. Due to these reasons most of the protective measures 
introduced against probable changes in governments of the future are not observed in Turkish 
politics, including co-optation.
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Political culture in Turkey does not allow emergence of necessary norms and ethic 
values to prevent the discretionary use of public authority. Losers do not attempt to punish the 
incumbent who makes them worse off. Instead they choose to support the opponent in order 
to capture the office and make it use for their own interest. They do not aim to restrict the 
actions of the government so long as they expect to use them in the future. For the similar 
reason inter-party competition does not serve the appearance of an effective monitoring and 
information mechanism. Parties prefer not to reveal particular information that might hurt the 
incumbent, in return for a similar treatment by the opponent. Usually party policies and use of 
public authority for collectivist interests of the supporting groups are highly criticized by the 
opposition; however individualistic use of authority is usually overlooked. In fact it is 
possible to apply repeated game strategies to this behavior: Parties act in a cooperative 
manner so far as all the players obey the rules of the game. Once the implicit agreement 
among the parties are violated, a punishment period begins which lasts until the re-settlement 
of understanding. When this behavior of parties comes together with the lack of voluntary 
organizations which perform the monitoring and information gathering tasks on the behalf of 
the society, imperfect monitoring of the representatives by the electorates even more 
exacerbates.
Fear-of-state creates another constraint to the effectiveness of monitoring of the 
representatives by the electorates. The incumbent party has the power to pursue policies that 
affect the welfare of the electorates and the electorates can do very little to escape from that 
effect. Once the elections are completed, the principal becomes subordinate to the agent. In 
the absence of voluntary organizations and organized pressure groups, electorates lack the 
necessary enforcement power over the politicians. This dependence may discourage the 
electorates from an effective monitoring of government actions. Extensive and dominant role 
of central authority in Turkey increase the risk of resisting the policies of the government. 
We may observe a similar situation when we examine the relation between the party 
supporters and the party lords. Although the party lords have an authority lower in magnitude, 
it may abandon the utilization of an effective monitoring by the party supporters.
2.2 The Bureaucracy and Its Role in the Political Process
In this section the relationship of the bureaucracy with the polity and politics will be 
examined. First, I will analyze the basic characteristics of Turkish bureaucracy. Then I will go 
into detail how these characteristics affect the behavior and attitude of agents. Discussion 
about the polity and politics which is presented above will also be used in this study.
2.2.1 Turkish Bureaucracy: Basic Characteristics
Two different types of administrative elite are present in Turkish bureaucracy: One is 
the old-fashion, statist group who possesses a modernizing mission. The other one is the 
politicized group who has either professional concerns or partisan views. The former was 
dominant in both the bureaucracy and intelligentsia until very recent decades. However 
beginning from the transition to the democracy in 1950s, the latter one has grew and 
overwhelmed the former.
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The inheritage of Ottoman state to the Turkish Republic was the modernizing ruling 
elite tradition. This tradition has been continued throughout the first decades of the republic. 
Since in those years the ruling party was the dominant player in the government with compare 
to the administrative elite, it would be useful to analyze the basic features of deputies during 
the period 1920-57“^ : These features of the ruling elite were summarized as follows:
• Age at first election is younger for university graduates and the official-origin 
deputies. Average age of the house continuously rises in 1920-1946.
• Proportion of university graduates continuously increases in that period.
• Before 1946, occupational distribution of the deputies is biased to civil-military 
officials and professionals. Trade and agriculture underrepresented. Beginning from 
1946 officials lost their power. Primarily trade and agriculture, then professionals 
dominated the parliament.
• Official-origin deputies have more publication, foreign language, and university 
education with compare to other groups. Economic groups (trade and agriculture) have 
the lowest.
• Birth in constituency (localism) increases after 1946. Unequal distribution of regions 
turns out to be equal distribution after 1950. Officials have the lowest localism, 
whereas economic groups have the highest. Local government experience is also 
higher within economic groups.
• Political science and law education dominates the parliament before 1946. After then 
law, engineering and trade education increased their share significantly.
• Re-election rate is highest within official-origin, then professionals, then economic 
groups. Re-election rates of official-origin is higher for Political Science Faculty 
(Miilkiye) graduates with compare to other universities.
• Occupation of father is official for 51% of official-origin deputies, economics for 56% 
of economics-origin deputies.
These results show that an average member of ruling class before the democratic 
period is young, intellectually talent, university graduated, possesses administrative and legal 
expertise rather than technical, has official background from both his own and his father's 
occupation, does not correspond to local interests and groups. Higher presentation and high 
re-election rate show that official-origin deputies dominates the administration. Basic 
dominant social background considerations other than official background occupational status 
are professionalism and influential position in local community. It is the reason of high 
localism and local government experience among economic groups. They can be recruited if 
they have the popular power. Official background,- professionalism, and popular support are 
important in this order. The continuous rise in average age of the parliament show the 
continuous reign of elite groups which are founders of the republic. Moreover occupations of 
official-origin deputies reveals that this elite structure has been inherited from the ruling elite 
of Ottoman state.
'6  Frey (1965).
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111 multi-party years senior bureaucrats become more professional in terms of their 
technical expertise. In 1970s only 41% of those are official-origin, whereas 25% are 
engineers, economists, technical personnel. Technical university education (engineering, 
economics, management) is almost as much popular as political sciences and law. Post­
graduate education covers 18% of senior positions'·^.
Motivation and preferences of this elite group is state-oriented. Due to their education, 
their objective and culture were different from the popular ones. Regarding themselves as 
other-regarding'" they have doubts about the effect of self-interested private sector on the 
general welfare. They resent the intervention of representatives of popular interest , i.e. 
politicians, to their 'business'. Below I will summarize the convictions of state elites who 
possessed the senior positions in the bureaucracy during early 60s and 70s'‘^ 2":
Official status has the lowest prestige (6%), and professional status has the highest
(68%).
Being politician is seen as a more useful way (35%) of serving to the country, with 
respect to an official status (12%).
Relation between education and earnings is not very much (0.31/1.00)
Satisfaction from the job decreases as political intervention increases (77% in State of 
Council and 30.7% in Interior Ministry). Prestige, status, and high income are the least 
effective factors (18.1%) that satisfy officials with compare to their role (43.4%) for 
entrepreneurs.
Politicians, religious and national groups are as harmful to the national interests 
communism and west.
Bureaucrats are of opinion that Turkey is not developing in multi-party system. Single 
party period (1932-39) is seen as golden years, and Atatürk and İnönü are believed to 
be more capable. Negative attitude towards politicians is more significant in agencies 
where politicians intervene more.
There is a negative attitude against foreign capital, and an inclination for high 
corporate tax, high direct tax, high wealth tax, and high agricultural tax.
With compare to entrepreneurs, bureaucrats are more prone to high public works, 
nationalization of foreign trade, high custom tax and less prone to decrease in tax 
levels, reduction in wage increases, and incentives on exports.
Those bureaucrats who accepts the presence of class-based politics are more inclined 
to single-party rule.
Elections are not accepted as a reflection of preferences of the society.
Although democracy in its ideal form is approved, democracy as practiced in Turkey 
is heavily criticized for its inability to select educated, experience, patriotic, and 
honest people to the government.
Cem (1976). 
Heper(1977). 
' ‘^ Saylan (1986). 
20 Heper (1976b).
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• Making consensus and compromise out of the principles of Kemalism is out of 
question. Preservation of Atatiirk's reforms is more vital than the economic 
development.
Relations of senior officials with their personal remain to be hierarchical, disciplinary, 
distrustful. More weight is given to supervision and control of the staff They are doubtful 
about the quality and experience of subordinates, rather than deficiencies of regulations and 
agencies; even less regarding to managerial and technical knowledge of the superiors.
Beginning from early 1950s the Turkish bureaucracy has come under pressure by the 
politicians. Before going into detail the challenge of politicians the authority of the 
bureaucratic elite, it is necessary to understand why this elite structure has emerged. Haggard 
and Kaufman22 introduce three sources of elite preferences: i.) Response of senior officials to 
a crisis in order to maintain and preserve the system, ii.) Technical competence within the 
bureaucracy initiated by professional concerns and promotion motive, iii.) Ideological 
orientation and coherence. In Turkish bureaucracy it is possible to observe the relative 
importance of all these effects on elite structure.
Differentiation of administration from the society is a common phenomena in many 
countries, though with different proportion. It is the usual division between the center and 
periphery, the ruler and the ruled. However its degree is determined by the characteristics of 
the societies: whether it is the state elite has a dominant role in the political process or not. 
Inheritage of the Ottoman state to the Turkish Republic was a coherent bureaucracy with class 
preferences. Although this elite structure was strengthened during the last century of the 
Ottoman Empire, its foundations were previously ready. The recruitment system eliminated 
the ties between the officials and the social groups and the education system designated by the 
state induced emergence of a separate administrative class distinguished by the society. But 
Ottoman officials were not centered around an ideological preference, other than continuance 
of their privileged positions. Decline of empire provided the necessary ideology to the 
officials: a modernization mission which promotes the dominance of state over the society. 
Turkish bureaucracy has preserved its elite structure and its basic features: highly educated, 
possessing western culture, relatively wealthy, and enjoying the respect of its status.
Politicians have challenged not only the authority of the state elite, but also its class 
roots. They were almost as educated as public officials^^. During multi-party politics they 
obtained a higher statue when they acquired the public authority^^. As salaries of officials 
decreased during 1960s and 1970s, wealth of political elite surpassed the bureaucracy (Figure
2' Cem (1976).
22 Haggard and Kaufman (1992).
22 About 60% of debuties were university graduates during the single party rule and this ratio continuously 
increased further after transition to multi-party politics in 1950 (Frey [1965] and Turhan [1991]).
24 According to the survey of Frey prime minister is more respectful and commanding after 1950, although it 
was third place during the first three decades of the republic.
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3-4). Also rise of private sector ceased the respect of the bureaucracy as the only means of 
livelihood for the educated. Governmental functions no longer overshadowed all other 
activities. As the sources of elite structure have been hampered, internal cohesion of the 
bureaucracy destroyed and it lost its power as a political player.
As the level of democracy increases, politicians begin to dominate the policy making 
process and the statist elite group lost their power in the public administration. It is possible to 
observe this depreciation by examining the change in prestige of certain occupations. In 1955 
there were 5 official status and only one economic status, businessman, among the best ten 
prestigious occupations according to the middle-level bureaucrats; governor, general, judge, 
diplomat, general manager -^'·. In 1970s they admire the independence of professionals, and 
power of politicians. Satisfaction of the public serve also decreases. A negative attitude is 
emerged against the politicians, especially in the agencies where the political intervention is 
the highest. Internal threats are supposed to be as dangerous as external ones. Results of 
elections are condemned and voters are criticized as too premature to decide on their own for 
their interest. They do not only reproach their loss of occupational prestige, but also the 
results of political intervention into the state affairs. They do not believe that politicians can 
serve to the country better than they can do. Under a popular rule, Turkey cannot be 
developed. A more statist growth policy is needed which emphasizes on government 
investments, high tax, restrictions on foreign trade and foreign capital. As polarization within 
the society increases, officials become more inclined to single party rules. They condemn the 
class based politics fearing the destruction of national unity.
Figure 3-4 : Average Salary/Deputy Earnings and Its Change
Across Periods
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In 1950s this pressure was for a compliant bureaucracy, rather than effective and 
neutral. In 1960s emergence and development of a strong private sector made it neeessary to 
have an effective and efficient publie organization. However polities in 1970s surpassed the 
need lor professional managers and eaused even more polarization and fragmentation within 
the bureaucracy. After 1980 military coup the role of private sector in economic and social 
life has been grown rather faster and exerted pressure into governments to create a 
bureaucracy that would serve to the requirements of private sector. Although politicization of 
the bureaucracy remains to be one of the primary concerns of governments, a more 
professional manager type has been also appeared. Many talent and edueated people have 
been promoted to the senior positions in the public service, especially in economy-oriented 
agencies. Thanks to rational and productive attitude of this officials a new type of cleavage is 
formed in the government-'’: Disputes between the political decision makers who concern 
about the public opinion and the professionals in the government who have concerns about 
the economy.
Despite the multi-party years for over 50 years, antagonistic tendency of the 
bureaucracy to politicians and guardian bureaucratic culture have not been vanished. Hence it 
is not a short-lived phenomenons· .^ One reason of this resistance is absence of a bureaucratic 
culture that enables politieal compromise and consensus. Officials are not inclined to learn to 
accommodate with the new political authorities. Another reason is education of the officials 
who were recruited during the first decades of republic. The generation of Atatiirkian period 
has come to high positions in the bureaucracy in 1960s and 1970s. A third reason is inability 
of politicians to formulate a new thought to challenge Kemalism and the idea of state 
capitalism^^. A fourth reason is continuous attempts of politicians to create a compliant 
bureaucracy by forming patron-client relations, rather than a neutral bureaucracy emphasized 
on efficiency and effectiveness.
2.2.2 Problems, Reasons, and Their Solution
In Turkey the government has enormous power to manipulate the agencies, especially 
the senior posts. Hence adverse selection problem is not concerned the incumbent so much as 
long as he has the full cooperation of the presidency who is the highest authority to approve 
appointments of higher ranks. Since the government gets its authority from the popular 
support of the electorates in elections and the president is elected by the representatives, it is 
very rarely that appointment decisions of the incumbent would be challenged by the president. 
So, though it is not possible to choose 'right' kind of people all the time, since it not difficult 
to change it, the incumbent can solve the adverse selection problem without further 
inconvenience. Especially beginning from 1970s, senior positions are so politicized that it has 
become a usual custom to change these positions without any significant restriction. Although 
manipulation of the lower ranks is more difficult, the incumbent may change the position and 
duty of the official or prevent the promotion to a higher position to create disincentives for the
26 Ahm et Evin(1988).
22 Smith (1974)
2« Heper(1977).
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'wrong' kind of people. However since promotion to a higher grade depends on the longevity 
of career, deterrence of these measures loses their power to a certain extent.
Personnel management of Turkish civil service is very sensitive to the demand of the 
politicians. Similar measures which are used against the adverse selection can also be applied 
to solve the moral hazard problem. Once the noncompliant behavior of the agent is observed, 
the incumbent may employ several alternative actions to punish the noncompliant: The agent 
can be dismissed if he has a temporary employment contract, he can be appointed to a passive 
position, he can be shifted to a local agency. These measures are very effective especially if 
the agent does not have a high supply price in external market.
Politicians are not expert of public policies, therefore they do not have full information 
about the actions of the agent and the environment. Although it is a very difficult problem to 
be informed about the actions of the agent, politicians find various ways to solve the 
information problem: First, they centralize the authority and delegate minimum authority to 
subordinates. Second, they appoint their supporters, who prove their loyalty, to the superior 
positions to monitor the behavior of the agencies. Third, they use the extra-party organizations 
to have information about the actions of the civil service. Finally, number of ministers without 
portfolio has been increased to benefit from the virtue of division of labor and specialization. 
Of course neither of these measures are perfect: centralize authority causes a massive 
information flow that is difficult to deal with, appointments to the bureaucracy or ministers 
may deviate from the objectives of the incumbent, extra-party organizations may provide false 
information to promote their interest, etc. Despite these problems political decision maker is 
able to exert a great authority over the bureaucracy.
Employment conditions of the Turkish bureaucracy do not lessen the problems of the 
incumbent. First, importance of partisan considerations may reduce the concern of agents for 
efficiency, especially if it is not possible to observe or verify their actions. Second, since 
promotion of officials between the grades depend on the longevity, they are more reluctant to 
take initiative which may risk their career in the public service. Third, low probability of 
promotion for the agents who have no political connections will lead to a retreatist attitude. 
Fourth, relatively low salaries of officials may cause corruption within the bureaucracy. Fifth, 
job security of the civil servants may initiate a unruly attitude, if their shift to an unfavorable 
position is not probable or probability of a change in government is high. If some officials 
who have political connections with the opposition expects its government. Finally retirement 
pension is not high enough to encourage compliant behavior. On the other hand one should 
also note that salary differences between the grades are so low that they may not lead to a 
shirking behavior. Officials should either work hard or seek political connection to promote to 
a higher post with a higher salary. Both will lead to a compliant behavior among the officials.
Politicians are willing to enjoy the benefits of manipulating the bureaucracy. Altough 
legislative drift is one of the concerns of the incumbent, it seems that benefits of present 
government overwhelm the costs that can be incurred by the future governments. Protective 
measures to safeguards the present arrangements are rarely applied due to restrictions imposed 
on the governing ability. Furthermore centralization of public authority and unstable formal
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arrangements caused by the parliamentary system disable the need for political compromise. 
Discretionary power of majority group both in the government and the parliament make it 
unnecessary to seek a consensus with the opposition in most cases. Remember that there is a 
certain trade-off between the legislative and bureaucratic drift which presents politicians a 
'legislative possibility frontier' that represents a certain combination of both. Administrative 
and political structure favored by the incumbent is rather similar to a corner solution where 
bureaucratic drift is minimized to acquire an effective organization at the expense of 
legislature drift which has the potential to nullify all previous policies. Even in coalition 
governments there is no much political pressure or formal rules to necessitate a bargaining 
process with the opponent. Ignoring the negative attitude of the public opinion the incumbent 
does not hesitate to make a partisan appointment. In most cases a compromise is not needed 
to get the approval of the president.
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In this section I will examine certain macro variables that may carry ideological 
meanings for politicians and bureaucrats. The reason of concentration on macro variables, 
rather than micro ones is that macro policies are supposed to be the real battle field for the 
players who have interests and preferences conflicting with each other. State elites perceive 
politicians as the representatives of particularistic interests of the society. Voters are not 
eapable of finding the true path for social welfare due to their level of education and the 
cooperation problem within society. Politicians face similar problem: though they are more 
educated, inter-party competition make them support particularistic demand of the pressure 
groups. What Turkey needs more than anything else is experienced and informed managers in 
the public policy making mechanisms.
Thus, I assume that serious clashes occur between the political and state elites in 
macro policies. Bureaucrats either fail or overlook the use of public resources by the 
incumbent for the individualistic interests of the party supporters, such as employment in 
public agencies, bank credits, subsidies, etc., or the local demand of voters for government 
investments on their district, such as infrastructure, social service, and industry facilities. 
Leaving the individual or local affairs to the politicians, they use their power to determine or 
change the more 'important' issues that may affect the national interests.
Foreign trade deficit causes a similar dispute between the politicians and state elites. 
Deficit figures are seen as a matter of national honor: the higher the deficit is, the more 
dependent is Turkey on foreign countries. Balanced budget and balanced foreign trade are two 
objectives of the statist elite. Deficit figures, at least, support the second part of this assertion 
(Figure 3-5 and 3-6). During the single-party rules governments are seem to be very sensitive 
on the balance of trade. There is almost no deficit, even after the second world war. In this 
period governments succeeded to resist a demand-boom of people who were relieved from the 
burden of the war. Democrat Party years witnessed the first big trade deficit. It is the first 
time an incumbent with popular support of the society possessed the authority. After military 
coup, reign of state elites seemed to get back the control over foreign trade. Their control even 
continued to a large extent during the administration of .Justice Party. However in 1970s
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politicians captured the public authority almost without any constraint imposed by the state 
elites. Remember that this is also the period when the bureaucracy lost its power as a political 
actor. Inter-party disputes even made things worse. We can observe how the cessation of 
distributional conflict during Motherland Party rules reduced the deficit figures in early 
1980s. Emergence of political competition after 1987 election trigger a re-increase of deficits.
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Figure 3-5: Average Trade Deficit per capita and Its Change
Across Periods
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Figure 3-6: Average Trade Deficit/GNP and Its Change Across
Periods
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It is surprising that public debt figures do not support the common notion that state 
elites are debt-averse. Especially foreign borrowings are regarded as conceding the 
independence of the country to the foreign capital owners and countries. Dislike of foreign 
debt is a natural inheritage of Ottoman Empire. After first borrowing in 1854, the amount of 
debts accumulated such a high level that the Ottoman state had to agreed with creditors in 
1881 to write off a particular portion of debts in return for capitulation of government 
revenues. However figures for debt for capita contradict with one's expectations for a debt- 
averse state elites and debt-prone politicians (Figure 3-7). Debt per Gross National Product 
(GNP) figures are even more surprising (Figure 3-8). Although a moderate increase after 1960 
military coup was occurred with an increasing rate in late 60s and throughout 70s, the real 
boom took place in 1980s during the rule of Motherland party. One reason may be the world 
conditions and the image of Turkey in the eyes of creditors as a borrower. While this factor 
partially explains low borrowings in late 1970s during the economic crisis in Turkey, the 
reason of low figures in 1950s and a sudden increase in early 80s is still ambiguous. A more 
sound explanation may be the presence of an agreement of political elite with the official 
dislike of foreign debt until 1980 military coup. Legal restriction on existing politicians and 
emergence of political parties may prevent the continuance of this agreement.
Figure 3-7: Average Foreign Debt per capita and Its Change
Across Periods
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Figure 3-8: Average Foreign Debt/GNP and Its Change Across
Periods
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To examine the rate of government expenditures is important to prevent a 
misunderstanding about the preferences of the politicians and the state elites. Although they 
disagree on most of the issues there are certainly certain fields in which they share common 
interests. Government expenditure is among these fields. Both sides favor high government 
expenditures, though with different purposes: Politicians are willing to spend more, because 
public spending is the most direct way of getting support, especially in less developed 
countries. State elites also prefer high spending, because they believe in the role of state for 
economic development and social welfare. When one examines the government expenditures 
per capita , it can be observed that these figures support the argument (Figure 3-9). It 
continuously rise with a significant rate until 1980. It is interesting that with compare to 
1950s and late 1960s this rise is higher in early 1960s when the statist policies were dominant. 
Then one observes a further increase in 1970s thanks to the rise in tension in political arena. 
The importance of inter-party politics on government expenditures may be recognized when 
we turn our attention to an enormous fall in change rate in 1980s which correspondences to 
almost stable government expenditures. Re-rise of role of state in economy is a natural 
consequence of unrestricted political struggle of late 1980s. The examination of government 
expenditures per GNP further proves the argument (Figure 3-10). This examination is 
necessary to understand that the implications of our analysis are robust to change in economic 
growth. Hence government expenditure does not only rise or fall not to respond the changing 
demand of the society, but due to political considerations.
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Figure 3-9: Average Goverment Expenditures per capita and 
Its Change Across Periods (1968 prices)
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Figure 3-10: Average Government Expenditures per GNP and 
Its Change Across Periods
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The common attitude of political elite and the state elite towards high government 
expenditure does not necessarily imply that they favour similar measures to finance it. They
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may even have disagreement about to what extent it should be financed. Use of tax revenues 
to cover spending is not preferred by the politicians, because it makes them unfavorable in the 
eyes of the voters. Also they are more deficit-prone due to reason that expansionary policies 
satisfy the demand of the society for high consumption and less unemployment, at least in the 
short run. On the other hand state elites, being free of restrictory pressure of voters, are more 
willing to have a balance budget. As it is discussed above, as official point of view it is a 
matter of national honor that should be fulfilled. Figures which show deficit per capita and 
deficit per GNP support this argument (Figure 3-11 and 3-12). After large budget deficits of 
Democrat Party in 1950s, statist policies of the early 1960s seemed to re-achieve a balance 
budget. But return of political elite to the power provoked a return to budget deficits. As the 
degree of political struggle expanded in 70s and the bureaucratic elite lost its influence over 
the governments, the budget deficit begun to increased at an increasing rate. After a slowdown 
in early 1980s, end of ban over politicians and emergence of distributional politics due to 
political competition caused high deficits again.
Figure 3-11: Average Budget Deficit per capita and Its Change 
Across Periods (1968 prices)
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Figure 3-12: Average Budget Deficit/GNP and Its Change
Across Periods
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Level of Central Bank credits supports the argument about the budget deficits. Since 
politicians are inclined to high government expenditures and tax-averse, high deficits occur, 
especially in those periods when the inter-party competition is severe. So, they prefer to issue 
banknotes to finance expenditures as it is shown in Figure 3-13. Note that the change across 
periods is exactly same with the deficits changes examined above. However one should be 
cautious about the meaning of data during 1980s. Development and monetary and capital 
markets after 1980 have decreased the dependence of governments on Central Bank and 
changed the instruments used to finance the budget deficits. So, it is probable that low figures 
in this period is not due to lower deficits, but less use of Central Bank to finance deficits. 
However this neither change the arguments stated above, nor their reliability. It is still 
possible to use Central Bank credits as an indication of tax-averse and expenditure-prone 
politicians. But it is not wise to use it for comparison of periods before and after 1980.
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Figure 3-13: Average Central Bank Credits per GNP and Its 
Change Across Periods
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4. CONCLUSION
After having constructed a general framework for the relationship between politics, 
society and the bureaucracy in the previous chapters, I have analyzed the Turkish case by 
adapting its basic characteristics to that framework. First beginning from the last century of 
Ottoman Empire, I have examined the historical developments throughout the republican 
period. Step by step I have tracked the evolution of politics, society, and the Turkish 
bureaucracy: how the Young Turk movement replaced one version of patrimonialist state with 
another version, how an elite structure was emerged within the higher ranks of the 
bureaucracy, their struggle with the political elites, their decline and cessation of their 
political pressure, and finally their gradual replacement by another bureaucratic type which is 
more professional and politicized.
Then I have concentrated on primary problems in the political system. Relationship 
between the society and politicians, internal structure of political parties, and the basic 
features of the Turkish society have been explained. It is showed that there exists certain 
problems that are common with the general context: the old-fashioned principal-agent relation 
and its problems both between the society and parties, and between the party leaders and party 
members; cooperation and commitment problems; lack of commitment mechanisms; and 
competition within the polity and political arena. Most of the behaviors and motivations of the 
players are similar: Voters try to elect their representatives who will serve to their interests. 
Politicians respond the demand of their constitutes in order to be elected, but also try to 
pursue their policy preferences. Everyone has a conflict with each other: Citizens compete to
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seize the state apparatus by authorizing their own representatives. Politicians compete to be 
authorized and capture public authority. Citizens do not trust their representatives who may 
forget the reason of their election; parties do not trust the word of each other, and so on.
However the following features of Turkish politics are extremely important: First 
centralization of authority and abundant public resources make the benefit of discretionary use 
of public authority extremely beneficial. Second, inter-party competition is too severe to 
permit political compromises and durable deals. Hence it is not possible to reach self- 
enforcing cooperative agreements. Since public authority is not divided within different 
bodies, the majority can enjoy the discretionary use of its power. Thus it is also difficult to get 
agreements enforced by law. Third, influence of electorates over politicians is limited with 
parliamentary elections. Once elections are completed, the incumbent may deviate from his 
electoral promises and follow party preferences. Fourth, competition in politieal arena does 
not permit the emergence of protective structures inside the bureaucracy which would resist 
legislative drift. Patronage is preferred to a merit system, at least in the middle and higher 
ranks. So, bureaucratic elite in Turkey is extremely politicized, despite the gradual appearance 
of a new professional manager type. Fifth, despite the manipulation of agencies, the 
bureaucracy is not effective to achieve the objectives of the ineumbent. Despite the extreme 
power of politicians over officials and policy making mechanisms, they cannot force the state 
apparatus to function effectively and efficiently. Sixth, although the importance of cultural 
cleavages has lost its power in 1980s, it is not possible to claim that economic issues are 
decisive in election outcomes.
The empirical evidence shows that certain macro variables are affected by the policy 
preferences of the bureaucracy. Budget and trade deficits, and the credits of central bank are 
among these important issues which create a dispute between the political elite and the state 
elite. When politicians dominate the policy making process and when the competition within 
the society is high, there exists high deficits and high central bank credits. Bureaucracy cannot 
restrict the expansionary policies of the incumbent. However if the distributional conflicts are 
restricted — as it is the case post-80 period — then politicians may revise their preferences and 
become more sensitive about these variables. They no longer pursue such policies, although 
the bureaucracy is not capable of restricting their action space.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this Master Thesis is to construct a framework to analyze 
interactions between politics, society, and the bureaucracy with each other. This 
framework is then adapted to the Turkish case to model policy making mechanisms in 
economic issues.
In the first chapter I have tried to present a comprehensive framework to 
understand transactions between the polity and political arena, assuming that the 
bureaucracy is not an independent player in the field. I divide these transactions into 
three fields: i.) Within the polity, ii.) Within the politics, and iii.) Between the polity 
and the politics. Then I have classified the problems seen in these fields into two 
categories: First, cooperation, coordination, and commitment problems which 
occurred among the groups competing to impose their interests on other groups. 
Second, problems observed in Principal-Agent relationship between politicians and 
electorates, and between party leaders and party members.
Then I have examined the reasons of these problems. In fact, problems of first 
and second field have many common reasons: First, the nature of public authority. 
Public authority provides such powerful instruments to the incumbent that players 
prefer to compete for the capture of this power and its discretionary use, instead of 
cooperation with their opponents, coordination of actions, and committing to previous 
deals. Second, the existence of conflicting interests which triggers and amplify the 
problem. Third, the information problems. Whether uncertainty is related to the 
future or the opponent or the individuals themselves, the result is same: suboptimal 
decisions in the absence of necessary information. There is one additional feature of 
the principal-agent relation occurred between the polity and politicians, that is 
multidimensional preferences. Since the decision of voters do not depend on a single 
issue, voters have to elect their representatives, though these politicians do not reflect 
their interests completely.
Examination of possible solution alternatives follow these problems. These are 
used either to enable bargaining process, or to reveal information, or to punish 
individuals who behave 'bad'. There may exist exogenous measures as well as 
endogenous ones: limiting action space of players either by legal restrictions or by 
informal norms and customs. However neither of these mechanisms are useful, unless 
most of players believe in their usefulness. It is always possible to find how to 
circumvent these measures and if sufficient number of players do so, then it becomes 
no longer optimal be complaint for the others.
In the second chapter I have examined the role of the bureaucracy in political 
arena as an independent actor which have preferences of their own. First considering 
different types of polity, I have classified various bureaucracy types to understand its 
behavior and motivation as a function of the environment in which it is operating. 
Then I have analyzed the behavior and motivation of agents. Two features of the 
bureaucracy, political involvement and bureaucratic distinctiveness, have been 
examined in this study. The first one represents the participation of officials to the
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decision making process, whereas the second one implies their preferences. This 
classification helps the understanding of bureaucratic behavior as a function of social 
and political variables.
Participation of the bureaucracy to the political scene as a separate actor 
creates certain problems in their relationship with politicians. Although it is a 
principal-agent problem for politicians, there exists one additional problem which is 
peculiar to public sector: Legislative Drift. The incumbent has to deal with not only 
the bureaucracy but also opponents who may capture the office in the future. By 
embedding disputes within politics in this analysis, I have attempted to construct 'a 
general equilibrium model', rather than 'a partial equilibrium model'.
Then 1 have examined available mechanisms to control the bureaucracy, the 
application of these mechanisms and their drawbacks. Some of them concentrate on 
the creation of certain incentives to prevent bureaucratic drift. Setting employment 
conditions is the best example of such behavior. Instead of dealing with each agent 
and agency one by one, the incumbent may prefer to determine the structure of 
internal labor market. Mechanisms embedded in employment conditions provide 
necessary incentives for a compliant behavior. Delegation of authority also serves the 
same purpose by creating a commitment mechanisms for the agent to the policies of 
government. Moreover leaving the agency alone with the society may also force 
bureaucrats to act according to the interests of politicians In all cases it is left to the 
agent whether to obey or not to obey these incentives.
On the other hand some controlling mechanisms emphasize on direct 
intervention of politicians to create a compliant agent through appointment system, or 
direction or restriction of action space of the agent. Other mechanisms aim to mitigate 
the information problems of the incumbent by providing necessary information about 
agents either by politicians directly or by the society.
All these measures have certain defects. Some these deficiencies are inherent 
in their structure. But the crucial factor which affects their operation negatively is the 
existence of problems within the political system. Concern for legislative drift 
overshadows the seope of principal's problems and prevent the construction of 
necessary mechanisms to control he agency.
In the last part I have studied how a 'good' bureaucracy may solve many 
problems I have examined in the first chapter. A competent and impartial bureaucracy 
assures the citizens that a cooperative behavior is for their own interest, at least in the 
long run. As the expectations of rewards from cooperation and rule-adherence 
increase, most of the cooperation and commitment problems are solved within the 
society and between the society and the state.
1 have analyzed the Turkish case in the third chapter by adapting its basic 
characteristics to that framework. First beginning from the last century of Ottoman 
Empire, I have examined the historical developments throughout the republican 
period. Step by step I have tracked the evolution of politics, society, and the Turkish 
bureaucracy: how the Young Turk movement replaced one version of patrimonialist
state with another version, how an elite structure was emerged within the higher ranks 
of the bureaucracy, their struggle with the political elites, their decline and cessation 
of their political pressure, and finally their gradual replacement by another 
bureaucratic type which is more professional and politicized.
Then I have concentrated on primary problems in the political system. 
Relationship between the society and politicians, internal structure of political parties, 
and the basic features of the Turkish society have been explained.
The following features of Turkish politics are demonstrated as the basis of a 
set up for modeling of interactions between polity, society, and the bureaucracy: First 
centralization of authority and abundant public resources make the benefit of 
discretionary use of public authority extremely beneficial. Second, inter-party 
competition is too severe to permit political compromises and durable deals. Hence it 
is not possible to reach self-enforcing cooperative agreements. Since public authority 
is not divided within different bodies, the majority can enjoy the discretionary use of 
its power. Thus it is also difficult to get agreements enforced by law. Third, influence 
of electorates over politicians is limited with parliamentary elections. Once elections 
are completed, the incumbent may deviate from his electoral promises and follow 
party preferences. Fourth, competition in political arena does not permit the 
emergence of protective structures inside the bureaucracy which would resist 
legislative drift. Patronage is preferred to a merit system, at least in the middle and 
higher ranks. So, bureaucratic elite in Turkey is extremely politicized, despite the 
gradual appearance of a new professional manager type. Fifth, despite the 
manipulation of agencies, the bureaucracy is not effective to achieve the objectives of 
the incumbent. Despite the extreme power of politicians over officials and policy 
making mechanisms, they cannot force the state apparatus to function elfectively and 
efficiently. Sixth, although the importance of cultural cleavages has lost its power in 
1980s, it is not possible to claim that economic issues are decisive in election 
outcomes.
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The empirical evidence shows that certain macro variables are affected by the 
policy preferences of the bureaucracy. Budget and trade deficits, and the credits of 
central bank are among these important issues which create a dispute between the 
political elite and the state elite. When politicians dominate the policy making process 
and when the competition within the society is high, there exists high deficits and 
high central bank credits. Bureaucracy cannot restrict the expansionary policies of the 
incumbent. However if the distributional conflicts are restricted — as it is the case 
post-80 period — then politicians may revise their preferences and become more 
sensitive about these variables. They no longer pursue such policies, although the 
bureaucracy is not capable of restricting their action space.
APPENDIX
Assume for simplicity that there are two periods and three steps in 
bureaucracy: The lower one with a salary of wp, the medium one with wjyj, and the 
higher one with w^. The probability of promotion from lower step to medium step in 
the second period for an official that is not caught shirking is p (if he is caught the 
probability is zero). The agent is at the lower step in the first period. Whereas the 
probability of promotion from low step to high step depends on both shirking and 
resources devoted for productivity, c. The probability of a shirking official being 
caught is q. The benefit of shirking for an agent is v which denotes the monetary 
equivalent of utility from enjoying leisure time. An agent who is caught while he is 
shirking cannot be dismissed, since shirking is not a violation of law. The agent is 
presumed to be risk neutral.
The agent is at the lower step in the first period. If he shirks and is not caught, 
he will not make a productivity investment and his promotion to the higher step will 
depend on partisan considerations. He will stay at the same level if he shirks and 
being caught. If he invests, then he will promote to the higher step with probability 
p(c). Every agent who shirks is supposed to have partisan support.
promote to 
medium step
wM+v
wH+v
/.) Salary:
In our model if the agent in the lower step does not shirk he receives, p(c)(wj-i- 
c)+(l-p(c))(wiyi-c). If the agent shirks he receives qwL+(l-q)(p(0)wpi+(I- 
p(0))wivi)+v. Then the agent will not shirk if,
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p (c)(w „-c ) + (l-p (c ))(w ^ ,-c ) > q w L + (l-q )[p (0 )w „+ (l-p (0 ))]w ^ + v
Suppose that p(0)=0, i.e. an agent who does not care about productivity cannot 
promote. Then the above the condition for not shirking will be written as.
(w „ -w ^ )  > -fqw, + v + c)
P(c)
Hence steeping the wage profiles will create an incentive for productivity. This can be 
made either by increasing the salary of upper position or lowering the salary of 
medium position. When individuals almost automatically promotes to medium grade, 
increase in salary from lower to medium step may encourage shirking if this increase 
is sufficiently high:
w„ - Wm - qw
P(c)
v + c 
P(c)
Note that the implications of the model seem to be inconsistent with the 
efficiency wage theory which indicates that higher wages should be paid to prevent 
shirking. The reasoning of the theory is that if the benefits provided to the agent is 
low, he will seek alternative ways of compensating the difference. One way is to shirk 
which enables the agent enjoy the benefits of leisure time. Another way is to increase 
his compensation using his authority in an illegal manner. Hence there is a lower 
bound for the salary at the lower step, wl. It should not be exceeded by the wage 
offer of private sector minus the indirect benefits of being in public sector. These 
indirect benefits are status, power, prestige, pension. Job security, etc. If these factors 
are taken into consideration, then it can be realized there are other ways of 
compensating the difference in salaries. Moreover the implications of the model is 
about the payments in each step. In other words the relative value of salaries are 
considered, not the absolute payments.
/7.) Prohahility o f  Promotion:
Above we assume that probability of promotion is not affected by partisan 
considerations (p(0)=0). Now suppose that resources devoted to productivity increases 
the probability but at a decreasing rate, i.e. p'(c)>0 and p"(c)<0. Furthermore suppose 
that all variables other than c is constant. Consider the right hand side of the last 
inequality. Obviously change in (-c/p(c)) will determine whether more productivity is 
beneficial for the agent or not. Note that more productivity increases the probability of 
promotion on one hand, but causes a disutility (extra working hours, etc.) on the other 
hand. The first effect is dominant as long as p(c)/(qwL + v + c) < p'(c) which means 
that increase in c is for the benefit of the agent, so he is more inclined not to shirk. 
Hence there is a threshold value for the amount of resources devoted to productivity.
Conclusion - 87
Now suppose that partisan considerations matter. People who does not care 
about the productivity can promote by their political connections. Hence p(0) > 0. 
Then we should rewrite the condition for not to shirk:
(w„ -W^,) >
(qw, + v + c) 
[p (c)-(l-q )p (0 )]
[p (c)-(l-q )p (0 )](w „ -w^^)>(qw, +v + c) 
p '(c)(w„ - w ^ ) > l
The right hand side of the above equality is greater than the previous one as long as 
there is no perfect monitoring, q<l. The second term inside the parenthesis indicates 
the discounted probability of promotion for a partisan agent. It is discounted due to 
the presence of risk of being caught. Hence the whole term inside the parenthesis the 
reward of a productive agent with respect to a partisan agent. As long as there is no 
perfect monitoring, the presence of partisan considerations in promotion will lead to a 
high agency loss.
UL) Dismissal and Tenure:
To understand the effect of tenure, assume that a senior official serves a fixed 
amount of periods, T, at the higher position. The probability of promotion depends on 
both investment for productivity, c, and tenure, T. Then the expected value of a senior 
position becomes p(c,T)wjqT where 5p/5T<0. So, the total effect of increasing the 
term of senior appointments on the expected value of senior position is [T9p/5T + 
p(T)]wjqdT. Note that the first term within the brackets represents the negative effect 
of tenure, and the second term represents the positive effect. If the agent in the
lower step does not shirk he receives, p(c,T)(TwH-c)+(l-p(c,T))(Tw]\4 -c). If the agent 
shirks he receives qTwL+(l-q)(p(0,T)Twjq+(l-p(0,T))Tw]vj)+Tv. Then the agent will 
not shirk if the following condition holds.
p(c)(Tw„ -c) + (l-p(c))(Tw^^ -c) > qTw, +(l-q)[p(0)Tw „ + (l - p(0))Tw^ ] + Tv
(w „-w ^,) >
qW| + v +
T
[p (c ,T )-(l-q )p (0 ,T )]
Since resources for promotion is spent for once and all, the prize of senior position is 
higher than a one-period long tenure. So, ceteris paribus, the presence of tenure will 
create an incentive for not to shirk. But it has another effect: the decrease in
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probability of promotion due long tenure of senior agents. I take the partial derivative 
of the right hand side with respect to tenure to capture both effect simultaneously:
aRHS
dT
j„‘'jp (c ,T )-( l-q )p (0 ,T )]-[q w , + v + ° ]
dT  ^ dT
[p (c ,T )-(l-q )p (0 ,T )f
gRHS
dT
>0
^ [ p i c . T ) - ( I - q)p(0,T)]-[qw , + v + 1 ]
dT dT
>0
Suppose that ap(c,T)/aX = ap(0,T)/5T. Then the last bracket will definitely be 
negative. Moreover suppose that p(c,T) > p(0,T). Then the term in first bracket will be 
positive. Hence the net effect of tenure on shirking will be ambiguous. If discounted 
probability of promotion for a partisan agent, (l-q)(p(0,T), is higher than this 
probability for a productive agent then the tenure will cause an increase in shirking 
behavior. Hence the net effect of tenure depends on the degree of monitoring and the 
probability of promotion for partisan and for a productive agent.
Now let's return to our original model and suppose that a special kind shirking 
carries the risk of dismissal. If he shirks in low magnitude, only the probability of 
promotion will be in danger. If he shirks in high magnitude and is caught, then he is 
dismissed. An official who leaves the public service can find a job in the private 
market with a wage, wp with certainty. This wage is less than he earned in public 
service, wp> wp. This assumption is not necessary, if one considers the time passed 
between the dismissal and re-employment, and uses this time as a discount factor. 
Value of low shirking is vp, and high shirking is vjq (vp< vf{).
If the agent in the lower step does not shirk he receives, p(c)(wiq-c)+( 1- 
p(c))(w]\4 -c). If the agent shirks in low magnitude then he receives qp^L+il- 
qL)(p(0)wjq+(l-p(0))w]vi)+VL. If he shirks in high magnitude then he receives 
qHwp+( I -qH)(p(0)wH+( 1 -P(0))wm)+vh·
The agent will prefer to shirk in low magnitude, not in high magnitude, if its 
expected utility is higher:
qwp+f 1 -q)(p(0)wH+( 1 -p(0))w]y[)+VL> qwp+( 1 -q)(p(0)wH+( 1 -p(0))wm)+vh
q(wp - wp) > VH - vp
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If we assume that value of shirking and private market wages are constant, this 
condition implies that the magnitude of shirking depends on the probability of 
disciplinary use of dismissal, q, and the salary at the lower step, wj .^ Recall the 
conclusion we derived under the title of 'Salary': If wl is high this will discourage 
productivity investment of the agent, since the expected reward of promotion 
decreases. Hence low value of wl will create an incentive for high productivity on 
one hand, encourage high shirking on the other. Since the effect of dismissal is not 
very high, there should be a great difference between the private and public market 
(wL-wp) to prevent high shirking. It is the reason people attribute great value to the 
public service in countries with high unemployment, although salary of junior 
officials is low.
iv.) Pension:
Pension has two effects on the agent. First it increase the amount of 
compensation. Second it increases the probability of promotion. Now lets examine 
these effects in our original model. Assume that pension is a constant proportion, r, of 
salary. For simplicity assume that there exists only two periods, and discount rate is 
embedded in r. d'hen the agent will not shirk if.
(l + r)(w„ -w^,
V q(l + r)w, +V + C 
^ p ( c ) - ( l - q ) p ( 0 )
The presence of pension creates an incentive for not to shirk, if.
( w h - W m ) >
qwL +
V + c
(1 + r)
p (c )-(l-q )p (0 )
Note this is a constraint which is weaker than the one for not to shirk in the original 
model. Flence the presence of pension reduces the agency loss.
Now suppose that it also increase the probability of promotion: p(c,r) and 5p/5 
r >0. Moreover suppose that 5p(c,r)/5r=5p(0,r)/5r. Then the condition for not to shirk 
has the following form:
(l + r)(w„ - w ^ , ) >
q(l + r)w, + V + c 
p (c ,r ) - ( l - q )p (0 ,r )
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The net effect of pension is found by taking the partial derivative of the terms on both 
sides:
aLHS
d r
= (w„ -W^,)
5RHS
a r
qw, [p(c,r) - (1 - q)p(0,r)] - [q(l + r)w, + v + c] 5p(c,r) ,, 5p(0,r)^ - c - q )  .or or
[p (c ,r)-il-q )p (0 ,r)]-
5p(c,r) ap(o,r)
----(1 -q )
[q(l +r)wL + v + c] L a r  a r
[p(c ,r)-‘}lTq)p(0,r)J [p (c ,r)-(l-q )p (0 ,r)]  [p(c,r) - (1 - q)p(0,r)]
In order to have a positive incentive for not to shirk, the following condition should 
hold:
a LHS a RHs------- > --------  <i>ar a r
- W m,
3p(c,r) ap(0,r)
- ( l - q )
[q(i + r)W| + V + c] _ a r  a r
[p(c , r )4M)p(0 , r ) ]  ^ [p(c,r)-(l-q)p(0,r)] [p(c,r)-(1-q)p(0,r)]
Note that the term on the right hand side is same as the previous condition. The term 
on the right hand side is negative if there exists some sort of monitoring (q>0) or zero 
if there is no monitoring (q=0). Hence this term is definitely less than or equal to zero. 
Then we can re-write the condition as follows:
(w„ -W^,) - · qw,.
[p(c, r ) - ( l -q)p(0, r)]
> a a e R·
Obviously this is a more relaxed condition than the one written for the case p=p(c) 
above. Hence the existence of pension will create an incentive for not to shirk due to 
its effect on compensation and probability of promotion. Note that this statement may 
not hold if the discounted probability of promotion for the partisan agent is greater 
than the productive agent.
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